RECONSTRUCTING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
THE CASE AGAINST DISCRETIONARY
ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGION
IRA C. LUPUt

For almost fifty years, judges, constitutional scholars, and
informed citizens have been drawn to the blinkered view that the
First Amendment's religion clauses involve the separation of church
and state.1 Derived primarily from the Supreme Court's centurybridging references to Jefferson's metaphorical wall, 2 the motifs of
distance and dissociation reflected in the idea of separation have
been among the enduring images of contemporary constitutional

law.
The metaphor, like all such creatures, channeled and therefore
limited thought. Even worse, its image was idealized and thoroughly unreal. For both individuals and communities, the metaphor
suggested a psychologically and socially impossible discontinuity
between the sacred and the secular. Human beings cannot neatly
compartmentalize their religious and nonreligious thoughts;
communities do not segregate their religious institutions and
leaders from others.3 Moreover, the metaphor does not account
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1 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 The language of separation appears in a letter from PresidentJefferson to the
Danbury Baptist Association and refers to the religion clauses as a whole. See Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878).
3 These are commonplace propositions in the psychology and sociology of
religion. See, e.g., GERHARD LENSKI, THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY
OF RELIGION'S IMPACT ON POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND FAMILY LIFE 120-31, 158-59

(1961) (discussing correlations between religious affiliation and political party
affiliation); GEOFFREY E.W. SCOBIE, PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIcION 122-23, 126-27 (1975)
(noting the relationships among religion, political attitudes, and society); MAX WEBER,

The Relationshipof Religion to Politics,Economics,Sexuality, andArt, in THE SOCIOLOGY
OF RELIGION 223, 223-45 (Ephraim Fischoff trans., 4th ed. 1963) (discussing the
interplay of religion and politics); Robert F. Drinan, Religion and Politicsin the United
States in the Next Fifteen Years, in RELIGION AND POLITICS 17, 31 (Fred E. Baumann &
Kenneth M.Jensen eds., 1989) (noting that "[t]he ideals of churches have become, to
a remarkable degree, the morality of the government"); Ernest L. Fortin, Church
Activism in the 1980s: Politicsin the Guise of Religion, in RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra,
at 33 (commenting on Christianity's "massive involvement of its leadership in the
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for all of the decisional law4 and is unreasonably tilted toward
nonestablishment and away from free exercise. The idea of
separation of church and state thus presents an image untrue to
both life and law. In this respect, it may be headed for a fate
similar to that which befell its cousin from the field of race law-the
doctrine of separate but equal.5
The constitutional era in which separation is the dominant
theme appears to be over. Clouded by inevitable tendencies toward
oversimplification, however, the debate about religion and the
Constitution is once again being framed in overly narrow terms.
Rather than strike out bravely toward a new, more refined approach
to constitutional questions concerning religion, judges and
commentators appear to be in search of a neat replacement for
separation.
As a result, the concept of accommodation has been rapidly
gaining ground as the central motif of religion clause thought. The
idea of accommodation of religion is complex in its details, but
simple in its basic premises. According to the accommodationists,
the religion clauses have the unitary focus of facilitating the people's
religious liberty, and government promotion of such liberty is in the
service of constitutional values. The Free Exercise Clause should
therefore advance, and the Establishment Clause should recede, in
6
constitutional prominence.

great social and political debates of our time"); John S. Mill, Utility of Religion, in
SOCIOLOGY AND RELIGION: A BOOK OF READINGS 96, 96-100 (Norman Birnbaum &
Gertrude Lenzer eds., 1969) (referring to the "temporal usefulness of religion").
4 Both Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968) and Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,315 (1952) upheld state-churchjoint ventures of a sort deeply
inconsistent with a separationist view. More recently, in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589, 593 (1988), the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to a federal program
that provided grants to private organizations, including those with a religious
character, for the purposes of responding to the problems of teenage sexuality and
pregnancy. Though not widely noticed, Bowen has set the stage for a general
repudiation of much of the law of church-state separation in the aid context. For a
criticism of accommodation of religion in recent Supreme Court decisions, see Ira C.
Lupu, The Trouble With Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming March
1992).
5 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6 In the academy, Professor Michael McConnell is the leading contemporary
advocate for the concept of accommodation, and his work is rigorous and thoughtful
in its embrace of that notion. The most forthright presentation of his view appears
in Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1
[hereinafter McConnell, Accommodation]. Professor McConnell's work has roots in a
number of prior writings on the religion clauses. See, e.g., Alan Schwarz, No Imposition
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I would like to say that this movement toward accommodation
is an improvement over the prior state of affairs, but I believe it is
not. The sense of harmony and tolerance evoked by the image of
accommodation is undoubtedly attractive on the surface. Nevertheless, when compared with separation, the new image is equally
limiting, equally untrue to large portions of the relevant case law,
and unreasonably tilted in the opposite direction-that is, toward
free exercise and away from nonestablishment.
In what follows, I stake out one version of the anti-accommodationist position. 7 I do not intend, however, to embrace the
of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 727-37 (1968) (arguing
that the Establishment Clause only prohibits aid that has as its motive the imposition
of a particular religion). Professor McConnell's version is unique, however, because
of his aggressive promotion of the general notion that government should be both
sensitive to and supportive of religion. For additional discussion by Professor
McConnell of his pro-accommodation message, see Michael W. McConnell,Neutrality
Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 146, 148-49 (1986) [hereinafter
McConnell, Neutrality] (arguing that government neutrality may in some cases be
insufficient to meet the needs of religious practitioners); Michael W. McConnell, The
Origins and Historical Understandingof Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1410, 1511-17 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Origins] (arguing that an interpretation
of the Free Exercise Clause that mandates religious exemptions was within the
contemplation of the framers of the Constitution); Michael W. McConnell & Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. Ci. L. REv. 1,
4-14 (1989) (proposing an economic definition of neutrality to determine when
government action impermissibly impinges on religious choice).
No one on the Supreme Court is an accommodationist in the same vein as
Professor McConnell-that is, no Supreme Court Justice is a champion of both an
invigorated Free Exercise Clause and a minimalist Establishment Clause. Justice
Blackmun may be the only sittingJustice who is in the former camp, andJustices
Scalia, Kennedy, and White, and ChiefJustice Rehnquist are firmly in the latter camp.
7 A number of the seeds of the anti-accommodation argument put forward in this
piece have been sown in my earlier work. See Ira C. Lupu, FreeExercise Exemptions
and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination,67 B.U. L. REV. 391,
399-431 (1987) [hereinafter Lupu, Religious Institutions] (criticizing free exercise
exemptions for institutions); Ira C. Lupu, Home Education,Religious Liberty, and the
Separation of Powers, 67 B.U. L. REV. 971, 979-90 (1987) [hereinafter Lupu, Home
Education] (defending state policies designed to divide power over children by
forbidding home education, even if motivated by religious choice); Ira C. Lupu,
Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONN. L.
REV. 739, 742-55, 761-69 (1986) [hereinafter Lupu, Keepingthe Faith] (arguing that the
religion clauses intersect with concerns for constitutional equality); Ira C. Lupu, Where
Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv. L. REv.
933, 966-90 (1989) [hereinafter Lupu, Where Rights Begin] (defending the concept of
judicially created free exercise exemptions and seeking ways of making the doctrine
more evenhanded); Ira C. Lupu, Risky Business, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1315-20
(1988) (book review) (criticizing Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church
ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), and the concept of
permissive accommodations).
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Supreme Court's unsound decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,8 which (paradoxically, it may seem
at first to some) has weakened my argument by eliminating what I
view as the only appropriate occasion for government accommodation of religion. Indeed, the best I can say for Smith is that it has
damaged the case for accommodation more than it has undercut the
case against it.
The title of this piece suggests hope as much as criticism. My
view is not so much against the idea of accommodation as it is for
the idea of balance in our understandings of the religion clauses.
Taken together, the clauses are most persuasively construed as
mandating a regime of equal religious liberty. Under such a regime,
every person may pursue religious freedom to the extent it is fully
9
compatible with the equal pursuit of religious freedom by others.
If accommodation is simply an overstride toward such a balanced
view, the concept may yet prove salutary. If, however, accommodation represents a set of ideas driven by zeal for religious liberty and
is consequently insensitive to concerns for equal respect in the
actual distribution of such liberty, the concept bears within it the
seeds of great harm.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I defines accommodation
and highlights recent decisional law on the subject. Part II explores
the purposes of the religion clauses, with particular concern for the
narrowness of the accommodationist vision of those purposes. Part
III focuses on Smith and its special significance for the constitutional
law of religious accommodation. Part IV then responds to two
arguments frequently advanced by accommodationist forces: one
argument concerns religion clause conflict, and the other is about
coercion as a limiting principle in Establishment Clause adjudication.
The bulk of the paper resides in Part V, The Case Against
Accommodation. Part V(A) presents the normative case, in which
I distinguish substantive and formal versions of religious equality
8 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990); see infra part III.

9 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60, 201-16 (1971) (arguing for equal
rights to basic liberty "compatible with a similar liberty for others" and defining
freedom of religion as a basic liberty); see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 150, 179-83 (1977) (interpreting Rawls' fundamental principle of liberty
as a "right to equal concern and respect in the design and administration of the
political institutions"); DAVID AJ. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTrrUTION
103-62 (1986) (arguing that equal respect for persons entails the "moral and
constitutional primacy of religious toleration").
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and offer both constitutional and nonconstitutional grounds for
preferring the latter. Part V(B) extends the argument into the
institutional case against accommodation, in which I argue for the
intrinsic superiority of adjudication over legislation as the instrument for special treatment of religion. Finally, in Part V(C), this
Article explores the implications of this institutional proposition for
judicial-legislative cooperation in affording distinctive treatment to
religion, with particular attention to the significance of Smith.
I. ACCOMMODATION DEFINED
Before I can sensibly proceed, a definition of terms is in order.
For me, government accommodation of religion has a straightforward, two-part meaning. The phrase refers to actions taken by the
state or its agents that 1) respond affirmatively to religion-based
claims for exceptional treatment, which would not be afforded but
for the religious quality of the claims or the religious character of
the institution(s) advancing the claims, 10 and 2) are not required

by the Free Exercise Clause or any other provision of the Constitu11
tion.
The definitional requirement that accommodation requests be
claims for special or exceptional treatment helps to bound the
category with which we are concerned. Most importantly, this
criterion excludes general programs of government benefits,
10 This portion of the definition (though not the second portion) is shared by
Justice Scalia. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 40 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Where accommodation of religion is the justification, by definition
religion is being singled out.").
11 This definition of accommodation is not the same as Professor McConnell's.
In making the case for accommodation, Professor McConnell includes both claims of
right (accommodations which the Constitution obligates government to make) and
appeals to political discretion. See McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 6, at 5. I
am concerned only with the latter; however, he and I do agree that courts should
recognize some free exercise claims as a matter of right. See Lupu, Where Rights
Begin, supra note 7, at 948-53; Michael W. McConnell, Free ExerciseRevisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. GHI. L. REV. 1109, 1144-45 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell,
Revisionism]. Although both of us think that the general reasoning of Smith is
constitutionally indefensible, Professor McConnell seems ambivalent about the actual
result of the case. See McConnell, Revisionism, supra,at 1113 (expressing uncertainty
about free exercise protection for the religious use of peyote). In addition, he
embraces, and I reject, a general doctrine of church autonomy. CompareMcConnell,
Accommodation, supra note 6, at 28 (claiming that "[c]hurch autonomy is a shared
value of accommodationists and separatists alike") with Lupu, Religious Institutions,
supra note 7, at 400-23 (arguing against recognizing religion clause rights in churches
as institutions).
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designed for purposes other than aiding religion, for which religious
individuals or institutions may (along with others) be eligible. Thus,
the inclusion of religious schools or charities in general programs
of aid is not an "accommodation" when such inclusion is based on
something other than the institution's religious character.
The second element of the definition, that the claim not be one
of constitutional right, may be of greater importance than the first.
Of course, many accommodation claims are advanced explicitly or
implicitly in the alternative. A person who believes that government
should recognize conscientious objection to conscription for

military service, for example, may argue that the government is
obliged by the Constitution to permit objector status, and that
government, in any event, should recognize such status for reasons
of policy, prudence, and/or subconstitutional principle.
The
distinction between these arguments is crucial. When government
is acting to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities or, to put it in
more usual terms, to respect constitutional rights, I am emphatically
for the result rather than against it. When government goes beyond
what the Constitution compels, however, it is privileging religious
claims in ways likely to offend constitutional norms and to reflect
poor statecraft.
Thus, the zone of accommodation cannot be described without
first establishing the baseline of constitutional right to exceptional
treatment for religion. We must first understand what state policies
the Free Exercise Clause mandates before we can begin to describe
any additional state policies that may be supported by the doctrine
of accommodation. Attaining such an understanding has always
been difficult as a matter of positive law and is now even more
challenging as a result of the Smith decision. Prior to Smith, the
descriptive difficulty arose primarily from the gap between the
standards the Supreme Court said it was applying and the outcome
of those applications. Time after time, the Court found waystypically, exceptions to the presumptively applicable free exercise
standard or unjustifiably weak applications of it-to conclude that
the free exercise claim was nonmeritorious.1 2 After Smith, the free
12 See, e.g.,Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 392
(1990) (holding that a generally applicable sales tax could be levied on a religious
organization without violating the Free Exercise Clause); Hernandez v. Commissioner,
490 U.S. 680, 683-84 (1989) (holding that payments made to the Church of
Scientology's branch churches for auditing and training services were not deductible
charitable contributions); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439, 441-42 (1988) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit the
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exercise standard has been still further defanged. In a world in
which no mandatory state policies exist, all government action
beneficial to religion qua religion is above the baseline, and,
therefore, presumptively within the zone of permissive accommodation.
The implications of Smith are crucial to the accommodation
argument, and I address them later in the Article. Smith, however,
is poor law, and I do not want to build the case against accommodation with Smith as my albatross.1 3 For purposes of my normative
argument, therefore, it may be best simply to assert what I believe

government from timber harvesting and road construction in an area traditionally
used for religious purposes by Native American tribes); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,
482 U.S. 342, 345 (1987) (holding that prison security policies were not violative of
the Free Exercise Clause); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986)
(upholding, as applied to an OrthodoxJew, an Air Force regulation prohibiting the
indoor use of headgear); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602-04
(1983) (upholding the government's denial of tax benefits to a university, which, for
religious reasons, prohibited interracial dating and marriage on campus); United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (upholding the imposition of social security
tax on an Amish employer). See generally Robert D. Kamenshine, Scrapping Strict
Review in FreeExercise Cases, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY 147, 154 (1987) (arguing that the
Court should make explicit that a middle tier standard rather than a strict review
standard is appropriate in adjudicating free exercise claims); Perry Dane, Note,
Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of CompetingAuthorities, 90
YALE L.J. 350 (1980) (criticizing "current exemption doctrine" and proposing an
alternative system of decision for religion-based exemptions); Developments in the LawReligion and the State (pt. V), 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1703-15 (1987) [hereinafter
Developments in the Law] (discussing religious exemptions under the Free Exercise
Clause).
13 Smith has been widely criticized. See, e.g.,James D. Gordon III, FreeExercise on
the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91, 91 (1991) (arguing that the Smith decision
"mistreated precedent, used shoddy reasoning, and ... deprived the free exercise
clause of any independent significance"); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free
Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. REv. 1 [hereinafter Laycock, Remnants] (criticizing Smith);
Lupu, supra note 4 (manuscript at 17-28, on file with author) (criticizing Smith);
McConnell, Revisionism,supra note 11, at 1111 (arguing that Smith is contrary to the
"deep logic of the First Amendment"); Harry F. TepkerJr., Hallucinationsof Neutrality
in the Oregon Peyote Case, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 1 (1991) (maintaining that the
Smith decision "distort[s] precedents" and undermines individual liberty). But see
William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise
Exemption, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 357, 386-412 (1989-1990) [hereinafter Marshall,
Case Against] (arguing against religion-based exemptions); William P. Marshall, In
Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 308, 308-09 (1991)
[hereinafter Marshall, Defense] (defending the outcome in Smith, but not the opinion
itself); Ellis West, The CaseAgainst a Right to Religion-BasedExemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 591, 633-38 (1990) (same); Philip A. Hamburger, A
Constitutional Right to Religious Exemptions: An Historical Perspective 3-19 (May
1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that constitutional
history does not support the concept of exemptions).
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the Free Exercise Clause requires of the government. First, the
clause prohibits the government from singling out religion for
especially bad treatment. 4 This prohibition includes overt mistreatment of religion-for example, the outlawing of taking
communion, performing ritual circumcision, or praying to idols-as
well as actions taken out of covert hostility, such as a zoning board
acting solely out of religious animus in denying permission to a
group seeking official permission to build a church in a particular
place. Political decisions that intentionally disfavor religion violate
the Free Exercise Clause, unless these decisions are mandated by
15
the Establishment Clause.
Second, and far more controversially, I believe, contrary to
Smith, that the Free Exercise Clause protects a limited class of
claims for religious exemption from laws of general applicability.
Although it is difficult to articulate the scope and limits of this
doctrine in a single phrase, I believe it presumptively protects claims
to refrain from actions which the claimant sincerely believes on
religious grounds will be deeply wrong to commit and claims to

14 The Smith opinion embraces this view. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1599 (1990)
(stating that states may not ban "acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in
for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display").
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla.
1989), affd, 936 F.2d 586 (1 lth Cir. 1991), offers an intriguing and difficult variation
on this theme. In Hialeah, the court upheld city ordinances regulating the ritual
slaughter of animals despite the city's apparent motivation to eliminate the practices
of one particular religion. See Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. at 1483-88. Professor Laycock,
counsel to the Church on appeal, discusses the case further in Laycock, Remnants,
supra note 13, at 66-68.
15 SeeMcDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618,628-29 (1978) (invalidating, on Free Exercise
Clause and Establishment Clause grounds, a Tennessee constitutional provision that
barred ministers from serving as legislators). Occasionally, prison officials act in ways
that intentionally disfavor religious exercise claims of inmates; all too often, and quite
mistakenly, courts treat such claims as identical to those involving incidental burdens
on religion generated by religion-neutral prison regulations. See, e.g., Hadi v. Horn,
830 F.2d 779, 784-88 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that occasional cancellation of Muslim
prison services when chaplain was not available and when chapel was needed for
recreational purposes did not violate inmates' First Amendment rights); Allen v.
Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 566-68 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that prison policy of
prohibiting inmate access to "Sweat Lodge" for exercise of religion was not
unconstitutional and that prohibiting inmates from conducting pipe ceremony did not
violate inmates' First Amendment rights); Brown v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 408, 412-13
(6th Cir. 1984) (upholding prison ban on group worship service of church that
ministered to the spiritual needs of homosexual prisoners), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215
(1985); see also Geoffrey S. Frankel, Note, UntanglingFirst Amendment Values: The
Prisoners'Dilemma, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 401, 432 (1991) (arguing for strict review
in cases involving the direct regulation of the religious practices of prison inmates).
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engage in actions which the claimant sincerely believes on religious
grounds will be deeply wrong to omit. Such claim of conscience are
privileged unless the state can successfully assert that exempting the
behavior will cause actual and substantial harm to significant state
interests.

16

This conception of free exercise, and the rather limited zone of
mandatory rights it generates, leaves open an expansive zone of
potential accommodation. Many religious customs and practices
have significance to religious people and institutions. Unless we are
prepared to make religious claimants judges in their own cause-a
status our law ordinarily does not confer on parties-the state's
judges will have to decide which religious claims are sufficiently
pressing to qualify as matters of right. Under any such process of
decision, decisionmakers will quite reasonably perceive many claims
as falling short of the requirement of "deep wrongs" to which the
clause may be limited. For example, practices which have become
customary within a religious community, yet in no way appear to be
the result of scriptural, theological, or other command, may not be
of sufficient moment to support a free exercise exemption from
laws of general applicability. 17 For still other claims, courts may
16 1 elaborate on the themes expressed in this paragraph and add concerns for
legal procedure and the special role of religious institutions in Lupu, supra note 4.
I do not pretend that thejudgments mandatedby any sensible theory of free exercise
adjudication are easy to make or uncontroversial. As a general proposition, however,
there appear to be only three basic choices: (1) no free exercise exemptions should
be granted, (2) all claimed free exercise exemptions should be granted, or (3) all free
exercise claims should be tested against a standard which measures, among other
things, their religious properties and the state's competing concerns. I reject (1), and
(3) seems far more appealing and prudent than (2). See Lupu, Where Rights Begin,
supra note 7, at 952-53 (arguing that free exercise standards must avoid extremes).
When free exercise rights overlap with free speech or press rights-that is, when
what is being regulated is expression, including religious expression-concerns unique
to the Free Exercise Clause may not add significantly to the constitutional analysis.
See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-11 (1940) (relying on general
principles of freedom of expression, as applied to religious speech, to set aside a
conviction ofJehovah's Witnesses who were soliciting in violation of a statute). For
the argument that the Free Exercise Clause should be held to do no more than the
clauses protecting freedom of expression, see Marshall, Case Against, supra note 13,
at 394-98; William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as
Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545 (1983) [hereinafter Marshall, Solving].
17 This is one of the reasons that Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), which
upheld the right of the Amish to educate their children at home, may have been
incorrectly decided. The practice protected in Yoder-removing adolescent children
from the public schools at age 14-was defined by the Court almost entirely on
communitarian rather than religious grounds. Although the right of association may
support some communitarian claims which arise from religious communities, I would
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agree on their religious significance yet conclude that the state's
case for the imperative character of non-exemption is overpowering.
Claims that are viewed as religiously trivial and claims that might
appear to judges to be trumped by insurmountable concerns of state
policy are candidates for permissive accommodation.
In addition, state policy governing the "business behavior" of
private institutions-for example, in matters of fund-raising,
employment, and taxation-may create impediments to freedom of
action by religious entities.1 8 Efforts to relieve these burdens also
fall into the accommodation category, although these matters may
not implicate religious precepts at all.
Exempting religious
organizations from property taxation, for example, makes organizational activity less expensive and complex, whether or not the
organization's members have religious commitments against the
payment of taxes.
Accommodation is an important subject these days not only
because its potential scope is far-reaching. The law respecting
voluntary accommodation of religion by government is unstable and
open to capture. Notwithstanding the dicta in Smith regarding the
appropriateness of voluntary accommodation, the Supreme Court's
two most recent and direct tussles with the topic-Corporationof the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos' 9 and Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock20-reveal substantial
uncertainty within the Court's current membership concerning the
21
scope of permissible accommodations.

not extend associational rights to parental claims made on behalf of children. Once
free exercise and associational rights claims are removed in Yoder, all that remains is
the authoritarian claim of parental control over the rearing of children. Based on the
facts in Yoder, I do not think that claim is weighty enough to surmount the combined
interest of state and children that the latter's formal education proceed.
For a sharply divergent view on the significance of religious command versus
custom, see Laycock, Remnants, supra note 13, at 24-26 (questioning the notion that
the Free Exercise Clause should protect only religious mandates and excludes
religious custom from protection).
5
SuSee Douglas Laycock, Towards A GeneralTheory of the Religion Clauses: The Case
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373,
1409-12 (1981) [hereinafter Laycock, Church LaborRelations] (discussing how some
church-owned businesses are run for religious reasons and are, therefore, affected by
government regulation); see also Angela C. Carmella, A Theological Critique of Free
ExerciseJurisprudence,60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 1992) (manuscript
at 13-23, on file with the author) (discussing how government regulation can burden
religion).
19 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
20 489 U.S. 1 (1989).

21 Several decisions rendered earlier in the 1980s had suggested a relatively hard
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In Amos, decided in 1987, a Court unanimous as to result
rejected an Establishment Clause attack on the exemption for
religious organizations from the federal prohibition on religious
discrimination in employment. Although Amos produced several
concurring opinions, they were primarily focused on the question
of confining the holding to nonprofit enterprises. In Texas Monthly,
a divided (6-3) Court invalidated, on Establishment Clause grounds,
an exemption from a state sales tax scheme for religious periodicals
"published or distributed by a religious faith." 22
As Justice Scalia argued strenuously in dissent, Texas Monthly
sends a very different signal concerning voluntary accommodation
than does Amos. Both cases involved statutory relief for religious
organizations from burdens of regulation or taxation. In Texas
Monthly, the Court struck down the exemption because it failed to
include secular periodicals. In Amos, the Court never suggested that
nonreligious associations might have analogous exemption
claims. 23 Amos rests in part on the legislative decision to relieve
religious organizations from burdens which the Free Exercise Clause
may prohibit.24 Yet that argument, arguably stronger in the state
25
tax context, was insufficient in Texas Monthly to save the scheme.
The different outcomes in the two cases can no doubt be
explained in a number of respects. The arguable underinclusion of
the discrimination exemption was not under direct challenge in
Amos; the complainants were dismissed employees who wanted the
exemption invalidated, not extended. In addition, Texas Monthly
relied in part on the Press Clause of the First Amendment and its
implicit prohibition of content discrimination in the dispensing of
tax exemptions relating to reading materials. 26 Nevertheless, the

line against permissive accommodations. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472
U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985) (invalidating a state statute which required employers to
accommodate employees' Sabbath designations); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459
U.S. 116, 117-20 (1982) (invalidating a state law that effectively authorized schools
and churches to veto liquor license grants to nearby premises).
22 Texas Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 5.
23 For example, organizations devoted to the interests of women might prefer to
hire only females-a preference upon which the statute forbids them from acting.
24 See Amos, 483 U.S. at 338.
25 Over Justice Scalia's strenuous protest in dissent, Justice Brennan, in Texas
Monthly, distinguished the sales tax from the occupational or license tax, see Texas
Monthly, Inc. 489 U.S. at 24, which the Court had previously established could not be
applied to the activity of itinerant preachers. See, e.g., Follett v. Town of McCormick,
321 U.S. 573, 577-78 (1944) (invalidating a flat tax as applied to preachers); Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116-17 (1943) (invalidating a flat license tax as applied
to Jehovah's Witnesses).
26 justices White, Blackmun, and O'Connor all concurred in the Texas Monthly

566

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 140:555

intensity of Justice Scalia's Texas Monthly dissent, joined by Justice
Kennedy and the ChiefJustice, suggests that members of the Court
are deeply divided over the question of voluntary accommodations.
The departure of Justices Brennan and Marshall, and the uncertainty of church-state views held by Justices Souter and Thomas, further
beclouds the picture.
This mystery is no doubt part and parcel of the general
uncertainty that has afflicted Establishment Clause adjudication of
late.
The Establishment Clause "test" advanced in Lemon v.
Kurtzman 27 has been ignored in significant contexts 28 and has
been highly criticized by judges and commentators, primarily on the
ground of insensitivity to original principles. 29 I share this view of
the "test," and I believe, in any event, that it is about to be interred.
I, therefore, now turn to the first principles that must underlie any
adjudicative approach to the religion clauses.

decision, and all relied on Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 234
(1987), which invalidated on Press Clause grounds a sales tax exemption for trade
publications, sports magazines, religious periodicals and sacred writings. See Texas
Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 26 (White, J. concurring); id. (Blackmun, J. concurring,
opinion joined by O'Connor, J.), see also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233, 251 (1936) (invalidating, on Press Clause grounds, a tax that was based on the
extent of a publication's circulation).
27 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In order to satisfy Lemon, a statute must meet a three part
test: (1) "the statute must have a secular legislative purpose," (2) the primary effect
of the statute must "neither advance[] nor inhibit[] religion," and (3) "the statute
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Id. at 612-13
(citations omitted).
28 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (falling to apply Lemon to
public support of a Nativity Scene); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792-95 (1983)
(failing to apply Lemon to legislative prayer).
29 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-56 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in the judgement in part and dissenting in part) (pointing out that
"[p]ersuasive criticism of Lemon has emerged"); Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,108-12
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Lemon test has "not provided
adequate standards for deciding Establishment Clause cases"); Benjamin D. Feder,
And a Child Shall Lead Them: Justice O'Connor,The Principleof Religious Liberty andIts
PracticalApplication, 8 PACE L. REv. 249, 271, 296-300 (1988) (criticizing the Lemon
test and proposing modifications to its application); Laycock, Church LaborRelations,
supra note 18, at 1380-88 (criticizing the Lemon test); Lupu, Keeping the Faith,supra
note 7, at 752 (criticizing the "effects focus" of the Lemon test); Michael A. Paulsen,
Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal ProtectionApproach to Establishment
Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 311, 315-17 (1986) (same); Gary J.
Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court:Rethinking the Court'sApproach,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 910-11,923-35 (1987) (proposing significant reforms to the
Lemon test). But see Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theo7y of the Establishment
Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 1113, 1172-82 (1988) (defending the Lemon test).
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II. THE PURPOSES OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
The accommodationist thesis depends on an artificial compression of the constitutional ends of the religion clauses. Indeed, this
generation's best known essay on the subject of accommodation
begins with the statement: "It is sometimes forgotten that religious
liberty is the central value and animating purpose of the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment."30 Accommodationists tend to
treat the Establishment Clause as a quaint relic, a secondary (and
slightly anachronistic) reflection of the constitutional goal of
3
religious liberty. '
The religion clauses have multiple purposes, all of presumptively
equal constitutional importance. Accommodationists are of course
correct that these goals include the protection of religious liberty
from state infringement. Accommodationists and separationists
alike hold that the state should not coerce religious choices. The
accommodationist argument, however, stops much too soon. As
Professor McConnell and virtually all other commentators and
judges concede, the religion clauses forbid sectarian discrimination.3 2 But why? The principle of religious liberty taken alone is
insufficient to fully justify an antidiscrimination principle, especially
if the principle applies to the provision of benefits. At this point,
the religion clauses' second animating concern-that of equal
religious liberty-must be brought into play. In a regime of equal
religious liberty, the state must treat all approaches to religion with
3
equal respect.
30 McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 6, at 1.
s1 See, e.g., RichardJ. Neuhaus, A New Orderfor the Ages, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1992) ("The no-establishment part of the religion (sic) clause is entirely
and without remainder in the service of free exercise."). Professor McConnell's most
recent work, moreover, strongly suggests that he continues to support marginalizing

the Establishment Clause. See his The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and
ReligiousSchools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989,992-93 (1991), in which Professor McConnell

likens, for constitutional purposes, government refusal to fund abortions with
government refusal to fund parochial schools. The essay, while provocative and

worthwhile in a number of respects, will surprise most constitutional lawyers with its
relative inattention to any basic theory of the Establishment Clause.
32 See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 106, 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); McConnell,

Accommodation, supra note 6, at 39.

11 See Lupu, Keeping the Faith, supra note 7, at 740 (arguing that principles of
equality should govern Establishment Clause cases); see also Alan E. Brownstein,
Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation and Synthesis of
Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OIo ST. L.J. 89, 91 (1990)
(arguing that interpretation of the religion clauses can be rendered more intelligible
by analogizing their meaning to equal protection doctrine); Paulsen, supra note 29,
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The goals of religious liberty and equal religious liberty
correspond rather well with the "origin[s] and the line of ...
growth" 34 of the two religion clauses in the First Amendment.
The prohibition on laws respecting establishment3 5 is primarily an
equal liberty provision; only secondarily is it concerned with
religious liberty in a noncomparative sense. An established church
has unfair competitive advantages over its rivals. Establishments
may rely on the state to compel attendance and provide financial
36
support. Moreover, as Adam Smith argued in Wealth of Nations,
which was published in 1776 and well known among American
constitution-makers, an established church may invoke state power
to

suppress

religious

dissent, and

may otherwise

undermine

religious equality.3 7 Echoing Adam Smith, James Madison argued

at 325 ("[T]he Establishment Clause is best understood as providing for the equal
protection of the free exercise of religion."); David E. Steinberg, Religious Exemptions as
Affirmative Action, 40 EMORY L.J. 77, 79 (1991) (suggesting that the Court should

authorize the use of religious exemptions to accommodate members of minority
reliious groups as a form of affirmative action).
4 ompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914) (citing Robertson v.
Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897) (Holmes, J.)).
35 As originally framed and ratified, the Establishment Clause, which proscribes
laws "respecting establishment," served federalism purposes as well as religious liberty
purposes. The clause guaranteed the states (as well as the people) that the federal
government would neither establish a national church nor legislate against existing
state establishments. See generally Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishmentand the
FourteenthAmendment, 1954 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 372-73 (arguing that the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause must be distinguished and that the former
cannot be incorporated into the liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment). The demise of state establishments in the early 18th century, however,
eliminated the explicit state-protecting purpose of the Establishment Clause.
Moreover, the application of the Establishment Clause to the states, by the process
of incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment, reinforces the character of the
contemporary Establishment Clause as a rights-bearing clause. See Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
Further, it is virtually impossible to argue, in terms of original intent, that the
Free Exercise Clause applies to the states but that the Establishment Clause does not.
The clauses are part of the same sentence, deal with the same subject, and represent
complementary parts of an overall constitutional strategy for dealing with the
problem of religion and government. Thus, the clauses must either rise or fall
together in their application to the states. If the case for incorporation fails, the
Fourteenth Amendment, standing alone, would exhibit greater Establishment Clause
characteristics than it would Free Exercise Clause traits; the Equal Protection Clause
is a more generalized version of the religious equality command, and the Due Process
Clause (given its procedural character) cannot easily be transubstantiated into a fount
of religious liberty.
36 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library 1937) (1776).
37 See id. at 741 (observing that established clergy may, in an emergency, "call
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in his famous Memorial and Remonstrance AgainstReligious Assessments
that churches supported by compulsory taxation need not depend,
as do others supported voluntarily, on the persuasiveness of their
38
message or the skill of their leaders in maintaining a following.
More subtly, the identification of a church with state power
reduces the dissonance between the claims of religion and those of
nationalism. A church with such a link benefits from a reduction of
competing loyalties, which otherwise might make the church less
appealing to the populace. 3 9 Constitutional prohibition of an
established church, and of more subtle acts of government sponsorship of religion, advances equal liberty to make choices respecting
religion by eliminating a crucial source of sectarian advantage.
Such a prohibition, however, only secondarily protects religious
liberty itself. A nonestablishment principle does not protect any
one religion against a surge of governmental hostility toward all
religions.4 0 Thus, quite appropriately, the second religion clause
protects religious liberty directly by proscribing laws that "prohibit[]
the free exercise of religion." 41 This clause creates the foundation
for the two basic principles, sketched above, of free exercise: (1)
that no acts of direct hostility by government against religion are
allowed; and (2) that exemptions from general laws for religiously
motivated conduct are sometimes required.
The task of constitutional interpretation of the religion clauses
is to recall and maintain both of these goals, despite the occasional
tension between them. The tension arises at the boundary between

upon the civil magistrate to persecute, destroy, or drive out their adversaries, as
disturbers of the public peace"); id. at 744 (arguing that religious sects which allied
with conquering political factions were "soon enabled in some degree to silence and
subdue" their adversaries). Smith also argued that established churches were at a
disadvantage, because their clergy tended to become indolent, and lose religious zeal,
id. at 741, and that nonestablishment would promote both equality and multiplicity
of sects as well as harmony among them, id. at 744-46.
38

JAMES

MADISON,

MEMORIAL

AND

REMONSTRANCE

AGAINST

RELIGIOUS

ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in Everson, 330 U.S. at 67-68 (app. to opinion of
Rutledge, J., dissenting).
39 See Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 117 DAEDALUS 97-118 (1988);
John Webster Grant, 'At Least You Knew Where You Stood With Them. Reflections on
ReligiousPluralismin Canadaand the United States, in 2 STUDIES IN RELIGION 340, 343
(1973); Robert T. Handy, The ProtestantQuestfora ChristianAmerica, in XXII CHURCH
HISTORY 8, 11-12 (J. H. Nichols & Wilhelm Pauck eds., 1953).
40 Professor Laycock has advanced a similar view in his criticism of Smith: "The
extreme case of substituting equality rights for substantive rights would be total
suppression of all religions." Laycock, Remnants, supra note 13, at 13.
41 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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religion and nonreligion; the Free Exercise Clause suggests the
privileging of religion over nonreligion, whereas the Establishment
Clause suggests the normative equality of the two. Nevertheless,
interpretation need not advance one of the goals at the expense of
the other or, more aggressively, seek to drive one of the goals
42
underground. As in other cases of intra-constitutiona conflict,
the goals of the respective provisions should be distinctly maintamined and conflicts between them resolved with attention and
respect to all competing values.
III. THE IMPACT OF EMPLOYMENT DIVISION,
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES V. SMITH
In April of 1990, the Supreme Court announced its decision in

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith. 43 The
sweep and grounds of the decision stunned constitutional lawyers
and commentators 44 and profoundly altered the backdrop of
principles against which the accommodation debate is played out.
The case arose from the denial of unemployment compensation
benefits to two members of the Native American Church. Because
they had ingested peyote at a Church ceremony, the two had been
dismissed from positions as counselors in a private entity devoted
to rehabilitation of persons addicted to drugs or alcohol.4 5 The
relevant state agency denied them benefits under a state law
provision disqualifying persons dismissed for work-related misconduct. 46 The state court reversed the state agency's decision,
reasoning that the disqualification impermissibly burdened the
47
petitioners' rights under the Free Exercise Clause.
The state successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for
review. In a little noticed and highly questionable decisional
maneuver, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case
to the courts of Oregon for a determination of whether peyote use
48
violates the state's criminal law.
42 Conflicts between free press and fair trial protections present a comparable
example. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 547 (1976).
43 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
44 See sources cited supra note 13.

45 See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1597.
46 See id. at 1598.
47 See id.
48 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660,673-74
(1988). Several reasons lead me to question the propriety of the remand for these
purposes. First, there was nothing in preexisting free exercise case law to suggest that
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On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the state's
criminal law included a general prohibition on peyote possession
and use but that Native American Church members were privileged
by the Free Exercise Clause against criminal conviction for peyote
use in religious ceremonies. 49 This conclusion enabled the state
court to reaffirm that the Free Exercise Clause forbade the state
from treating the petitioners' peyote use as disqualifying them from
50
unemployment insurance benefits.
The state authorities once again obtained Supreme Court
review. This time, however, the Supreme Court relied on the state
court's view concerning the criminal law status of peyote use to
reverse the state court's judgment about the free exercise claim. In
an opinion that swept far beyond what was necessary to rule in the
state's favor, 51 the Court announced a general principle that the
Free Exercise Clause standing alone would never entitle religiously
motivated conduct to a judicially created exemption from state
the criminal law treatment of the activity for which constitutional privilege was sought
was of special relevance. Second, and quite simply, Smith and Black had not been
criminally charged for peyote use; it was entirely possible that their conduct was
privileged against an adverse application of unemployment compensation principles
but was not similarly privileged against an application of stronger state purposes
reflected in its criminal law. Third, as revealed in the Smith opinion in 1990, the
remand simply provided a foundation, albeit highly questionable, for treating this
case as a request for constitutional exemption from a law of "general applicability"
rather than as a claim that "work-related misconduct" could not include constitutionally privileged activity. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1599. This latter version of the claim far
more accurately and less tendentiously describes it and had more than ample support
in Supreme Court precedent. See McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 11, at 1111-12
(arguing that the state court's holding that Oregon may not "treat the exercise of
religious practices as 'misconduct' warranting denial of otherwise available benefits,"
appears to be an unexceptional application of well-established precedent).
49 See Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 763 P.2d 146, 148
(Or. 1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
So See id. at 149-50.
,' Justice O'Connor's concurrence concluded that the peyote users' claim in this
case was insufficient in light of preexisting free exercise standards; she, therefore,
criticized the majority for so aggressively and unnecessarily altering the law. See
Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606 (O'Connor,J., concurring in thejudgment). The dissent's
view, which similarly criticized the majority's general approach but reached a different
conclusion about the constitutionally privileged character of the claim, is far more
persuasive thanjustice O'Connor's opinion. Only the dissent articulates and applies
normatively appropriate standards. See id. at 1615-23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor, however, may have been correct in her appraisal of the Court's
recent attitude toward free exercise claims. See generally Kamenshine, supra note 12,
at 147 (arguing that although the Court purports to apply strict scrutiny to
regulations adversely affecting religious freedom, it effectively applies a less
heightened standard that it should acknowledge).
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criminal laws of general applicability. Although written by Justice
Scalia, the leading proponent on the Court of judicial reliance on
the original meaning of the text, 52 the opinion simply ignores the
circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Free Exercise
Clause. Nor does the opinion even faintly attempt to parse the
53
Clause's text.

The Court's new principle apparently derives instead from two
related sources. The first is a substantive concern for legal stability
and predictability. The Court avowedly fears the "anarchy" that
would result from permitting religion-based exemptions from
general laws. 54 The second is institutional, and reflects doctrines
of judicial restraint. The Smith opinion expresses horror at the
prospect, implicit in the pre-Smith law, "that federal judges will
regularly balance against the importance of general laws the
significance of religious practice." 55 Neither the substantive nor
the institutional bases for Smith can be limited to the criminal law,
and the lower courts have thus far made no attempt to confine it to
that field.5 6
52 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 862
(1989). Justice Scalia's defense of originalism does not mesh with institutional
circumstance; members of the Supreme Court have neither the time nor the
professional skills to engage in systematic historical research. When the professed
decisionmaking method does not fit the decisionmaking process or the personnel,
something gives. In Smith, to a far greater extent than usual, the professed method
vanished.
At the very least, the use of the word "exercise" should occasion a reflective
pause. See generally McConnell, Origins,supra note 6, at 1414-16 (analyzing various
sources to determine the probable understanding of the drafters and ratifiers of the
Free Exercise Clause).
54 See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1605.
55 Id. at 1606 n.5.
56 See Salvation Army v. NewJersey Dept. of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183,
194-96 (3rd Cir. 1990) (holding that the Supreme Court's decision in Smith is
applicable to civil as well as criminal statutes); Rector, Wardens, and Members of the
Vestry of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348,354 (2nd Cir.
1990) (holding, in light of Smith, that the application of New York's Landmarks Law
to the church's property did not violate its right to the free exercise of religion), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991); Calderon v. Witvoet, 764 F. Supp. 536, 541 (C.D. Ill.
1991) (holding, in light of Smith, that requiring an employer to obtain insurance, as
required under a migrantworkers law, did notviolate the employer's free exercise of
religion); United States v. Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Soc'y of
Friends, 753 F. Supp. 1300, 1304 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding, in light of Smith, that levies
upon delinquent income taxes, owed by employees of a Quaker organization refusing
to pay the portion of their taxes allocable to military purposes, did not violate the
Free Exercise Clause); Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558, 559 (D.R.I. 1990)
(withdrawing, in light of Smith, an earlier opinion that had required an exemption for
members of the Hmong religious sect from the Rhode Island law governing
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Finally, and of central significance to the question of permissive
accommodation, the Court in Smith suggested that legislatures,
unlike courts, could single out and especially protect religiously
motivated conduct. 57 In particular, the Smith majority suggested
the appropriateness and permissibility of a legislatively drawn
exemption from the criminal prohibition on peyote use for
members of the Native American Church. 58 Smith's institutional
concerns may be paramount to its substantive ones. 59 In this view,
special legislative treatment for religion-indeed, for particular
sects-is not a matter of constitutional worry; only judicially mandated special treatment is forbidden by the Constitution. Legislatively
granted exemptions no longer represent presumptively impermissible favoritism for religion. According to Smith, such exemptions are
60
the democratic process doing its work.
In two powerfully important respects, Smith has altered the
landscape of accommodation. First, as a substantive matter, it has
made virtually all special and positive treatment of religion a matter
of political discretion, rather than a matter of constitutional right.
Courts are essentially removed from the business of protecting
religion from the incidental burdens inflicted by general laws. Only
the political branches of government remain free to do anything
designed to create a positive and special benefit for religion, and
Smith invites them to do it. With a vengeance, Smith elevates

autopsies).
In addition, the Court in Smith distinguished prior Supreme Court decisions
upholding free exercise claims in such a way as to cast doubt on the continuing
validity of those decisions and to undermine the independent importance of the Free
Exercise Clause in constitutional adjudication. See generally Gordon, supra note 13,
at 94-104 (criticizing the Court's efforts to distinguish pre-Smith decisions that would
have required the application of the "compelling interest test"); Laycock, Remnants,
supranote 13 (criticizing the theoretical conceptions behind Smith and examining the
practical and doctrinal impact of the Smith decision); McConnell, Revisionism, supra
note 11 (criticizing the Smith Court's theoretical argument as well as its use of legal
text, history, and precedent).
57 See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
58 See id.

59 Smith "officially" announces that henceforth courts should underenforce the
Free Exercise Clause and leave most of the implementation of religion clause norms

to the political branches. For exploration of the notion that Smith can be fit into
general notions of nonjusticiability, or that issues arising under the Free Exercise
Clause will henceforth present "political questions," see Lupu, supra note 4. For a
general discussion of the legitimacy, propriety, and significance ofjudicial underenforcement, see Lawrence G. Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212 (1978).
60 110 S. Ct. at 1606.

574

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 140:555

concerns of separation of power and judicial restraint over established notions of judicial responsibility for the protection of
constitutional rights.
By writing courts out of, and all other branches into, the
accommodation process, Smith eliminates constitutional compulsion
from the field and replaces it with political discretion to respond to
the special claims of religion. 61 The zone of accommodation has
thus grown wider and perhaps more permissive than at any time in
the past thirty years. The scope of such accommodation is crucial
to religious persons and institutions seeking to advance claims of
religious exemption, because they are now directed to turn
exclusively to nonjudicial bodies for redress.
IV.

CLEARING THE DECKS

Two arguments, frequently advanced in discussion of the
respective roles of the religion clauses, must be briefly confronted
prior to making the case-in-chief against accommodation. The first
of these has to do with the assertion of irreconcilable conflict
between the religion clauses; if such conflict exists, it is sometimes
argued, it must be dissolved in light of the overarching value of
religious liberty. 62 The second of these has to do with the role of
coercion in the law of the Establishment Clause; in order both to
diminish the scope of the Establishment Clause and to accentuate
the relative importance of the Free Exercise Clause, accommodationists insist that coercion is an essential element of an Establishment Clause violation. Both of these moves should be resisted.
A. Resolving the Clause Conflict

The view has been advanced that the religion clauses are on a
collision course;63 the very same practices that the Free Exercise
Clause demands of government are simultaneously forbidden by the
Establishment Clause. 64 A common illustration is the question of
conscientious objector status for those opposed on religious
grounds to participation in war. 65 Such status seems compelled by
61 See Gordon, supra note 13, at 111 (arguing that eliminating constitutional
compulsion will tend to reduce the frequency of legislative exemptions).
6
2See McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 6, at 6.
63 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970); Jesse H. Choper, The
Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PrIT. L. REv.
673, 673 (1980).
6 See Choper, supra note 63, at 674.
65 See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 448-54 (1971) (holding that
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free exercise, but granting such status to religious over purely moral
66
claims is thought to benefit religion and therefore to establish it.
An interpretation that produces such a result is to be avoided,
for reasons ranging from the coherence of constitutional principles
concerning religion to a larger concern for the integrity of constitutional interpretation. One way to avoid the conflict is to apply an
overarching constitutional norm-the government's obligation to
remedy or avoid violations of the rights of particular individuals has
priority over general limits on government power. To borrow an
example from race relations law, the government may reserve
particular opportunities for African-Americans if there has been a
sufficient finding that African-Americans have been wrongfully
denied those opportunities. 67
The same government action,
however, may violate constitutional norms of racial equality if taken
68
without the predicate of prior violation.
Government action which affords special treatment on the basis
of religion is highly similar. If that treatment is designed to remedy
a pre-existing violation of the Free Exercise Clause or to avoid what
would be a violation of that clause, it is constitutionally appropriate.
If there is no such predicate, the same action violates norms of
69
religious equality and is impermissible.
This sort of reconciliation of the religion clauses allows for full
recognition of free exercise rights. It does not, however, stand for
the larger proposition that whatever advances the religious liberty
of some is consistent with the religion clauses. Free exercise rights
trump Establishment Clause limits, but free exercise "values" do
not, because of the impact on religious equality and the religious
liberty of others that would be the result of such a general favoring

granting conscientious objector status only to those opposed to all wars did not

violate the Establishment Clause even if that requirement disparately impacted certain
religions).
16 See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(expressing the view that conscientious objector status cannot be granted to those
with religious beliefs in pacificism without also granting the status to those with
secular, moral beliefs in pacificism).
67 See City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509-11 (1989).
68 See id.; see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-09
(1978) (Powell,J.) (requiringjudicial, legislative, or administrative findings of specific
instances of discrimination before the government gives preferential treatment on
compensatory grounds to individuals from a group whose members have been victims
of discrimination).
69 If this reconciliation is viewed as free exercise priority, I will accept it as such,
on the sole ground that free exercise rights are held on an intensely personal and
individualized basis, while nonestablishment rights are shared in common with all.

576

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 140:555

of free exercise interests. By the same token, Establishment Clause
"values" do not trump free exercise rights. This analysis of clause
conflict, of course, makes it essential to be precise about the content
and force of both religion clauses, and therefore precludes the kind
of tilting associated with both separationism and accommodationism.
B. Beyond Coercion

The anti-accommodation argument rests as well on an understanding of equal religious liberty that transcends the notion of
freedom from coercion. In both government and the academy, the
proponents of accommodation recently have been advancing the
idea that coercion is an essential element of an Establishment
Clause violation. 70 In the amicus brief for the United States in Lee
v. Weisman,71 the public school commencement prayer case on this
Term's Supreme Court docket, the government has boldly asserted
this proposition, arguing that only those practices that coerce
religious belief or observance should be held to violate the Establishment Clause. 72 In particular, the government's brief argues
that the plaintiff in Lee v. Weisman was not coerced because she was
73
not "required" to participate in or "witness" the ceremony.
The government's position is deeply flawed. First, it would
essentially render the Establishment Clause superfluous. Government compulsion of individuals to attend and to participate in a
religious ceremony offends core principles of political freedom and
free exercise; individual choices concerning whether and how to
engage in expression of religious significance may not be dictated
by the state. 74 An interpretation of nonestablishment that renders
See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659-62 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissentingin part); Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost
Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933 (1986).
71 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991) (No. 901014).
72 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2028, Lee v. Weisman, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305
(1991) (No. 90-1014) [hereinafter Brief for the United States]. Indeed, the brief
presents the case's sole question as "Whether government accommodation of religion
in civic life violates the Establishment Clause, absent some form of government
coercion."
Id. at I.
7
3 Id. at 24, 25.
74 See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding that New
Hampshire's interest in requiringall state license plates to bear the motto "Live Free
or Die" did not outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to refrain from
70
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it redundant cannot capture its meaning,75 original or otherwise,
and should be avoided on general principles of constitutional
construction.
Second, the definition of coercion is a matter of serious debate
and difficulty. 76 Once one gets beyond the obvious case of dire
threats-your prayers or your life-there remain knotty problems of
whether coercion attends conditioning government benefits upon
participation or passive acquiescence in religious ceremony. The
only way that Deborah Weisman could receive her junior high
school diploma in front of her parents and the rest of the school
community was to attend a ceremony that included prayers to which
she and her family objected. Were she and they put to a coercive
choice?77 If the community of which the Weismans are a part is
likely to ostracize those who object to or absent themselves from a
religious ceremony, is the government agency that sponsors that
ceremony responsible for the social coercion that accompanies it?

expression); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(holding that a local rule compelling public school students to salute the flagviolated
the First Amendment). One of the disturbing features ofJustice Scalia's opinion for

the Court in Smith was its favorable citation of Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310
U.S. 586 (1940), the decision that Barnette overruled. See Employment Div., Dep't of

Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1600 (1990).
75 See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (arguing that the right
of individuals to avoid religious coercion is protected by the Free Exercise Clause;
official support of government for religious tenets violates the Establishment Clause
whether
or not coercion is present).
76
There is an elaborate literature on the legal and philosophical problem of
defining coercion. See Richard A. Epstein, UnconstitutionalConditions,State Power,and
the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REV. 4, 11-14 (1988) (highlighting and discussing
the gap between common law notions of coercion and theories of unconstitutionally
coercive conditions on government benefits); Seth F. Kreimer, AllocationalSanctions:
The Problem ofNegative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1352 (1984)
(arguing that the government's use ofallocational sanctions is subject to constitutional constraint and that allocational sanctions should be analyzed by determining
whether they are threats or offers); Lupu, Where Rights Begin, supranote 7, at 961-63
nn.106-13 and sources cited therein; Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions,
102 HARv. L. REv. 1413, 1428 (1989) (criticizing traditional analyses of unconstitutional conditions for focusing wrongly on whether conditions coerce individuals and
suggesting that courts should instead apply close scrutiny to these situations).
g7 Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1778 (1991), suggests that the Solicitor
General and the Court's majority have a view of coercion that is narrow indeed. Rust
is distinguishable, however, because the injury inflicted by the government upon
pregnant women consisted of silence on questions regarding abortion, a subject about
which a pregnant woman would know to inquire elsewhere. In Lee, by contrast, the
public graduation ceremony was the only opportunity for community recognition of
the achievement.
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Third, under any definition of what government practices
constitute coercion, there remains a crucial question concerning the
kind of coerced acts by individuals that are relevant to the inquiry.
The government's brief in Lee focuses on coerced attendance at
religious ceremonies, but what of coercive taxation to support the
activities of churches? The Madisonian conception of church-state
relations included such taxation as a vice to be condemned, 78 but
the proponents of accommodation have been content to limit their
concern for coercion to ceremonial participation and taxation
designed to finance explicitly spiritual activities of churches.
However coercion may be defined, the Establishment Clause is
impoverished and distorted if it is limited to government action that
coerces conduct. Suppose Congress charters a Church of the
United States with explicit provisions that no person shall be
compelled to attend and that no funds shall ever be drawn from the
U.S. Treasury to support the Church in any way. The Church
thereafter is built and operates exclusively through private financial
support. Although no person is coerced in this scenario, can there
be any doubt that the Act's provisions 1) granting the federal
charter and 2) conferring the title of Church of the United States
violate the Establishment Clause? No coercion is necessary to
support a finding of violation when the statute straightforwardly
delivers to this Church the prestige of association with the national
79
government.
Moreover, a theory premised on coercion ignores the comparative right to participate in, or not be excluded from, the benefits
generated by the political community. 80 It is difficult to argue in
78

See MADISON, supra note 38.

79 In his Allegheny opinion,Justice Kennedy suggested that government practices
that "threatened" to establish a church might violate the Establishment Clause, even
if such practices were not coercive. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,

660-62 (1989) (Kennedy,J, concurring in part and dissenting in part). The brief for
the United States in Lee echoes this suggestion. See Brief for the United States, supra
note 72, at 6-7 (arguing that "civic acknowledgements of religion in public life do not

offend the Establishment Clause, as long as they neither threaten the establishment
of an official religion nor coerce participation in religious activities"). NeitherJustice
Kennedy nor the Administration offers any examples of a noncoercive practice that
threatens to establish a state-sponsored religion, and it is possible that the
hypothetical discussed in the text would qualify as such a threat. Why annual
government sponsorship of a Christmas creche does not constitute such a threat is

difficult for me to comprehend.
10 See generally Kenneth W. Simons, Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L.
REV. 387, 416-52 (1985) (distinguishing between comparative and noncomparative

constitutional rights).
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contemporary America that discrimination in the distribution of
government benefits is not of constitutional significance.
A
program of government benefits for white persons only, or for
Republicans only, would surely violate the Constitution, though the
former cannot be viewed as coercive at all and the latter is coercive
only in the weak sense of altering associational incentives. Religionbased distributions are similarly flawed. A federal program of
discretionary grants to artists and writers may not be limited to
Christians, even though the program may produce no coercion at
all.
Such a result is reinforced by, but does not depend upon, the
Equal Protection Clause. 81 Sound constitutional intuition suggests
that such a discrimination in the distribution of benefits would have
been as invalid in 1850 as today. One strand in the reasoning
supporting such a result involves the 1787 Constitution's only
religion clause, which provides that "no religious Test shall ever be
required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the
United States."8 2
The principle underlying this clause-that
religious affiliation cannot be the basis for defining the relationship
between a citizen and her government-strongly suggests that
religious tests for any government benefit are unacceptable.
Even without regard to the "religious Test" Clause, however, the
threat to Establishment Clause values arising from official discrimination is plain. If such discrimination were allowed, the government could create significant incentives to join a sect, and thereby
manipulate religious allegiances in ways highly analogous to the
psychic pressure generated by an established church. To use Dean
Jesse Choper's language, such government activity may "compromise or influence religious choice." 83 Yet coercion, in the narrow
81 For further analysis of this problem in explicit equal protection terms, see

Brownstein, supra note 33, at 102-12; Lupu, Where Rights Begin, supra note 7, at 98287. See also David E. Steinberg, Note, Church Control of a Municipality: Establishing
a First Amendment InstitutionalSuit, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1363, 1382-87 (1986) (noting

that the religion clauses, like the Equal Protection Clause, protect group rights).
82 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3; see also Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961)
(invalidating a state constitutional provision requiring state officials to declare their
belief in God).
8 Choper, supra note 63, at 700; see also William Van Alstyne, Trends in the
Supreme Court: Mr.Jefferson's CrumblingWall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984
DUKE L.J. 770, 787 (asserting that American government is "Christian-pretending,"
and that "[I]ate arrivals to America" will "be made to feel ungrateful should they
complain").
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sense of threatened deprivation or punishment, is nowhere to be
seen in such a scenario.
V. THE CASE AGAINST ACCOMMODATION

The case against accommodation, as I have defined it, rests on
a variety of considerations.
Some are overtly derived from
constitutional principles, primarily the Establishment Clause and its
promise of equal religious liberty. A distinctly secondary set of
considerations, removed from the Constitution, rests on social and
political views concerning the special significance of religious
association. Together, these two parts of the argument make up the
substantive case against accommodation.
An additional set of premises in the case against accommodation
are constitutionally rooted in a different sense; they draw on
concerns associated with the decisional qualities of adjudication and
the institutional qualities of the judiciary. These premises make up
what I describe below as the institutional case against accommodation.
A. The Substantive Case Against Accommodation
The case against accommodation rests primarily on the
constitutional promise of equal religious liberty. Equal religious
liberty is simply one of a series of parallel constitutional commitments-equal respect for ideas, for consciences, for privacy, for
racial, ethnic, or religious identity, and for voluntary associational
choices. The strong prohibition in the law of free speech against
government discrimination on the basis of speech content, for
8 4
example, derives substantially from this sort of principle.
Moreover, accommodationists like Professor McConnell cannot
blithely ignore the need for some strong version of an equality
principle in this field. Judges, such as ChiefJustice Rehnquist, and
commentators who support the broadest scope for the political
accommodation of religion, and consequently, the narrowest version
of nonestablishment, nevertheless concede that sectarian discrimination is unacceptable. 85 Unfortunately, these judges and commen84 See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 20-21 (1975) (discussing "the principle of equal
liberty of expression"). See also Susan H. Williams, Content Discriminationand the First
Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 615, 666-76 (1991) (noting that general theories of
equality apply to speech).
8' See Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)

1991]

RECONSTRUCTING

THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

581

tators never say why this is so, and much in the law of the religion
clauses turns on the explanation. Regulation of religion is not like
trade regulation; the state cannot proceed "one step at a time,"
singling out its favorite sects for benefits and its least favorite
religious groups for detriments, and defending the discriminations
on flimsy grounds of rationality. Some version of constitutional
equality with real constraining force over political decisions is
implicit in the prohibition on sectarian discrimination.
As constitutional lawyers and others have long recognized,
however, equality is hardly a self-defining concept. For many years,
constitutional battles have raged between two basic approaches to
problems of constitutional equality. One approach asserts the
normative proposition that government should not distribute
benefits and burdens on the basis of traits over which the individual
has little or no control-for instance, racial or gender identity. This
approach, which of late has tended to appeal to political conservatives, has been assigned a variety of labels-formal equality, equality
8 6
of opportunity, abstract equality, and individualistic equality.
Although I do not like the pejorative associations evoked by the
label "formal," I will use it in the context of equal religious liberty
because others have used it.
The leading rival to the formal view begins with the proposition
that we are all, to some extent, defined by the character of groups
with which we are associated. Therefore, the state should affirmatively recognize the different histories and agendas of such groups,
strive to preserve what is culturally distinctive about each, protect
group members against subjugation and unreasonable discrimination, and fashion group-based remedies for group-based wrongs.
Such an approach has attracted a set of labels opposing those

(stating that "preference among religious sects" is forbidden, but that the government
may use "nondiscriminatory sectarian means" to pursue legitimate ends); Arlin M.
Adams & CharlesJ. Emmerich, A HeritageofReligious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1559,
1635 & n.319 (1989) (noting that all religions stand as legal equals and that one
cannot be favored over another).
86 Recently, the voices most associated with this view are justice Scalia, given his
opinion in City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,527 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring), and William Bradford Reynolds, who represented President Reagan's
Department ofJustice on these matters. See William B. Reynolds, Individualism vs.
Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995, 996 (1984). Political conservatives do not monopolize this view. See William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the
Supreme Cour4 and the Constitution,46 U. Cm. L. REv. 775, 775-79 (1979) (suggesting
that the bad effects of allowing race into decisionmaking will more than offset any
beneficial effects that affirmative action plans produce).
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enumerated above-substantive equality, equality of outcome or
result, historical equality, and group equality. This version of
equality theory tends to be associated, at least in the field of gender
and race relations, with those commonly described as politically and
constitutionally progressive.8 7
Although I dislike ceding the
rhetorical advantage to rivals, here, too, there is precedent in the
religion clause commentary for describing this approach as
88
substantive.
In what follows, I develop and analyze both of these approaches
in the context of equal religious liberty. The formal approach
would forbid legislative accommodations of religion, except,
perhaps, in cases in which legislatures simply anticipate what courts
enforcing the Free Exercise Clause would in any event require. The
substantive approach, by contrast, would require a great many
legislative accommodations. The strongest case against accommodation combines the case against the substantive conception of equal
religious liberty with the case for the formal conception.
1. The Perils of Substance
Substantive equality theory would be far more receptive to
religion than would formal theory. Substantive theory requires
affirmative sensitivity to religion rather than the benign neglect
produced by formal theory. Substantive conceptions of religious
equality require the state to guarantee that religious interests are
not inadvertently overlooked in the political process. This, of
course, means that actors in that process must be continuously

87 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 379 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (providing a "progressive"
viewpoint with respect to remedying past racial prejudice in university admissions);
id. at 400-02 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (allowing race
to be considered in university affirmative action plans); id. at 403-04 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that group racial discrimination
in medical school admissions must be remedied); see also Owen M. Fiss, Groups and
the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976) (stating that the
progressive "group-disadvantaging principle" takes better account of the idea of
equality); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and EqualProtection: Reckoningwith
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (arguing in favor of a progressive
view of racism in light of Washingtonv. Davis); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Comment, Sins
of Discrimination:Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 96-98
(1986) (explaining progressive, forward-lookingjustifications for affirmative action).
88 For a comparable distinction between the formal and the substantive, see
Douglas Laycock, Forma Substantive andDisaggregatedNeutrality Toward Religion, 39
DEPAUL L. REv. 993, 999-1006 (1990).
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religion-conscious.
Given the unlikelihood and presumptive
impropriety of legislative focus on particular individuals in the
formation of policy, this religion-consciousness will necessarily
translate into sect-consciousness.
In this sect-conscious frame of mind, an accommodating
legislature would presumably impose upon itself a set of substantive
equality norms. First, inadvertent discrimination against religion
generally or against particular sects should be avoided in the
formation of policy. Second, religious practices should presumptively be afforded the same treatment as their secular analogues. A
third, more specialized version of substantive equality might focus
on the receptivity to claims concerning God or religion made in
public fora, because the proponents of substantive equality for
religion frequently contend that a secularized public forum reflects
hostility, not neutrality, toward religion, and is therefore unaccept89
able.
The first two concerns of substantive theory--rejection of secular
monopoly or superiority and avoidance of sectarian discrimination,
inadvertent or otherwise-will produce dramatic consequences. In
some instances, particularly where the state's substantive interests
are trivial, the results may seem generally desirable. What reasonable objections are there to making sure that dress codes do not
inadvertently punish those who cover their heads or faces for
religious reasons,9° or to taking steps to preserve quaintly unusual
religious traditions like those of the Amish?9 1
Other contexts, however, will produce more troubling questions.
Consider the case of parental responsibility for the physical wellbeing of minor children. A formal egalitarian would view this as a
simple matter; all parents must make reasonable judgments
concerning whether and when to seek conventional medical
attention for an ailing child. Religious affiliation, or lack of it,
89 See, e.g., RicHARDJ. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE 82 (1984) (asserting

that since "government cannot help but make moral judgments of an ultimate
nature," wholly secularized policy is really "secular humanism" or "ersatz religion").
go See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1986) (upholding an Air
Force dress code regulation that prevented an Orthodox Jew from wearing a
yarmulke).
91 See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397-99 (Minn. 1990) (holding, in a
case remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Smith, that
the state constitution protects an Amish buggy-driver from a law requiring that slowmoving vehicles display a special emblem).
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would not operate to erase the potential culpability of those who
92
breach custodial duties of this sort.
A requirement of substantive equality would, by contrast,
demand a very different approach. According to the substantive
view, the privileging of science over faith constitutes unacceptable
discrimination against religion. In order, therefore, to achieve
substantive equality for religion, faith has to be put on a presumptively equal footing with the methods and insight of science. One
committed to substantive equality for religion would ask whether,
for some families, prayer and/or other spiritual healing techniques
function equivalently to conventional medicine in the family life of
others. If those who use doctors rather than prayer in the effort to
heal their ailing children are presumptively not neglectful, or
culpable if the children are not cured, should not those who use
prayer instead of conventional medicine be equally immune to
charges of neglect or assertions of culpability?93
The sort of problem presented by state policies concerning the
physical care of children is replicated in the context of public school
curricula. The conceptual connection between matters of race and
religion is strong, if one recalls the debate about Euro-centered
versus Afro-centered curricula. A set of arguments quite similar to
92 This has been the stable position of the courts in cases in which parental failure
to seek medical care for an ailing child has appeared to be causally linked to the
child's death. In such cases, free exercise claims have not prevailed. See e.g., Walker
v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 869-71 (Cal.) (holding that involuntary manslaughter
and felony child-endangerment prosecutions of a Christian Science parent did not
violate her free exercise rights), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989).
" For a discussion from the perspective of Christian Science, see Thomas C.
Johnsen, Christian Scientists and the Medical Profession: A Historical Perspective, in
FREEDOM AND

RESPONSIBILrrY:

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE HEALING FOR CHILDREN 55

(Manager of Christian Science Committees on Publication ed., 1989) (tracing the
development and legal acknowledgement of Christian Science spiritual healingin the
early 1900s); David N. Williams, Christian Science and the Care of Children: The
Constitutional Issues, in CHRISTIAN SCIENCE: A SOURCEBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY

MATERIALS 181, 181-86 (Christian Science Publishing Society ed., 1990) (arguing that
Christian Science healing is effective and consistent with secular standards of parental
responsibility for children). For a similar perspective on questions of religious versus
secular educational choices, see McConnell, supra note 61, at 1004 (analyzing religious
and secular schools as "substitutes" in the economic sense). See also George W. Dent,
Jr., Religious Children, SecularSchools, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 941 (1988) (noting that
public education must not impede religion). The substantive view suggests as well
that government programs that subsidize medical treatment, such as Medicare and
Medicaid, must include faith-healers among the group of reimbursable providers. But
cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1771-76 (1991) (holding that regulations

prohibiting the use of Title X funds for abortion counseling do not violate First
Amendment free speech rights).
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those that support the case for Afro-centrist teaching underlies an
accommodationist position as well; the teaching of secular versions
of human origins and values creates substantive inequality between
those families who instruct their children in such secular accounts
and those who rely exclusively on theological explanations for our
existence and for the presence of good and evil. A true multiculturalism must be responsive to religious as well as racial, ethnic, and
other forms of diversity.
Accommodation of this concern, however, creates an unusually
devilish set of problems.9 4 To what extent and with what tools are
accommodationists prepared to remedy this sort of inequality? Is
the answer separate classes for deeply religious children, or
mandatory instruction for all children in religious as well as secular
accounts of morality, creation, or social arrangements? If mandatory instruction is the answer, which religious account(s) will be
offered?
In substantive equality theory, as in formal equality theory,
sectarian discrimination is presumptively unacceptable.
Any
accommodation for faith-healing, for example, thus cannot be
limited to respectable, educated, middle- and upper-middle class
94 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987) (holding that Louisiana
creationism and evolution instruction laws, mandating balanced treatment, are
unconstitutional); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (finding that
Arkansas anti-evolution teaching statute is unconstitutional); Mozert v. Hawkins
County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987) (refusing to exempt public
school students from using a school reader offensive to their religious beliefs), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). The literature on these cases is extensive. See, e.g.,
Dent, supra note 93 (discussing the problems with and possible remedies for
accommodating the rights of religious children in public schools); Stanley Ingber,
Religion orldeology: A Needed Clarificationof the Religion Clauses,41 STAN. L. REv. 233,
288-332 (1989) (distinguishing between sacred qualities of religion and human
inspiration of ideologies, and applying the distinction to problems arising from the
place of religion in the public school curriculum); Edward J. Larson, A Spectator's
Guide to Aguillard v. Edwards: PartII TextbooksJudges, andScience, 17 CUMB. L. REV.
116, 117 (1986) (referring to Aguillard as ,a new avenue for creationist arguments
about instruction in public schools); Lupu, Where RightsBegin, supra note 7, at 942-44,
949-52 (discussing the Mozert decision and its implications in regard to the burdening
of religious liberty); Mary H. Mitchell, Secularism in PublicEducation:The Constitutional
Issues, 67 B.U. L. REv. 603, 664-746 (1987) (exploring the legal issues associated with
promoting secularism in public schools); Nadine Strossen, "SecularHumanism" and
"Scientific Creationism':ProposedStandardsfor Reviewing CurricularDecisions Affecting
Students' Religious Freedom, 47 OHIo ST. L.J. 333, 336-54 (1986) (discussing legal
challenges to the teaching of "secular humanism and scientific creationism" in public
schools); Wendell R. Bird, Note, Freedom of Religion and Science Instruction in Public
Schools, 87 YALE LJ. 515 (1978) (discussing various problems and possible solutions
in regard to the teaching of evolution to religious children attending public schools).
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sects like the Christian Scientists, but must be extended to their
grubbier or less well-known counterparts.9 5 Moreover, as a matter
of political dynamics, accommodations will typically breed pressure
for more accommodations. Public display of Christmas symbols will
inevitably lead to demands for public display of symbols of
Chanukah, Easter, and religious holidays heretofore less well-known
in the West. Who will decide which symbols are displayed? For
how long? How large, prominent, noisy, or otherwise intrusive may
they be? In which public places? 96
Relax. We know that the slide to full accommodation of these
religious claims-all of which, when viewed from the perspective of
adherents, are perfectly reasonable and highly compelling-is highly
unlikely. The reason why that is so tells tus much about the
problems of substantive equality theory and the vices of accommodation. Those in the position to accommodate will have grave
difficulty maintaining objectivity about where lines are to be drawn.
Customary practices are likely to be accommodated; unusual ones
are less likely to be so treated. Among the unusual practices, it is
improbable that the more threatening ones will receive a warm
reception from the state's decisionmakers. At most, the state will
define its accommodation policy so as to limit its exposure to
unknown or undesirable sects. 97 A regime of accommodation,
designed at least in part to produce substantive equality between
nonreligious and religious interests, is highly likely to privilege
mainstream, well-known religions, or locally dominant ones, and
thereby to aggravate conditions of religious inequality.
The Constitution's architects were aware of dangers of this
character. As Madison argued in Federalist No. 10, the spirit of
faction is likely to be particularly strong in small communities. 98
95 See, e.g., Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 121320 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding refusal to exempt Peyote Way from prohibition on
peyote use, despite federal statutory and regulatory exemptions for Native American
Church). For further examples of the legislative tendency to be overtly or covertly
sect-specific, see Lupu, supra note 4.
96 For a comparable problem in the political speech context, see Lehman v. City
of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1974) (upholding refusal of municipal
transit system to accept political advertising on the ground that it would create
difficult problems of rationing). For the suggestion that these problems be solved by
a rule that allocates to all religious holidays whatever time and space are publicly
allocated to the holiday most heavily observed in public institutions, see Lupu, supra
note 4.
97 For more detailed analysis of this point, see Lupu, supra note 4.
98 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 22 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981).
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Moreover, the danger presented by religious faction may be
stronger than other types of division. Because religion tends to
speak to questions of ultimate truth and not merely to matters of
interest, the intensity of reaction and intolerance produced by
accommodation fights may be among the most extreme our politics
can produce. Indeed, as attractive as the image of multicultural
diversity and harmony may be, the experience of other nations with
the relationship of religious sectarianism to politics is hardly
99
encouraging.
Thus, it seems truly unimaginable that a regime of politically
selected and approved accommodations will produce results
consistent with any overarching, theoretically sound conception of
substantive religious equality. A regime of purported substantive
religious equality will probably turn out to be quite the opposite.
For instance, the distinctions between accommodations made and
those not made will frequently rest on religious prejudice, ignorance, or other unacceptable grounds. In a pro-accommodation
climate, such distinctions are likely to stand undisturbed.
2. The Substance of Formalism
Theories of formal equality depend on a judgment that certain
traits constitute impermissible bases for defining groups for
purposes of government policy. Qualities like race, gender, and
ethnicity are the most commonplace examples of such traits in our
constitutional law of equality. Under formal theory, once such
categories are identified, it matters not whether the object of
government policy is the majority or the minority, the powerful or
the dispossessed. Policies that favor African-Americans or women,
for example, are presumptively as troublesome, under formal
theory, as are policies favoring Caucasians or men.10 0 The bright
lines produced by formal theory are typically defended on grounds
of fairness, because the theory offers protection against the
imposition of burdens on the basis of traits for which persons
cannot be held responsible, and on prophylactic grounds of
99

See, e.g., S.R. BALESHI, CONGRESS, MUSLIM LEAGUE AND PARTITION OF INDIA
(1990); JOHN FULTON, THE TRAGEDY OF BELIEF: DIVISION, POLITIcs, AND RELIGION
IN IRELAND (1991); WINFRED E. GARRISON, INTOLERANcE (1934).
100 See City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see also Metro Broadcastingv. Federal Communications Comm'n, 110 S.

Ct. 2997, 3044-45 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that racial classifications

embodied in law are presumptively impermissible).
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preventing tyranny, because the theory limits the danger of
invidious classifications masquerading as benign.
In the context of the religion clauses, formal equality produced
a famous proposal from Professor Kurland: Religion cannot be the
explicit basis of any classification, either beneficial or detrimental,
by any branch of government. 01' The Kurland principle would
have forbidden permissive accommodations and judicially-mandated
free exercise exemptions. Moreover, the principle would have
permitted a great deal of aid to religious institutions, so long as
their religious character was not the basis for the aid. Primarily
because of this pro-aid, anti-separationist consequence, Kurland's
view was unacceptable to many scholars and judges of his genera10 2
tion.
As Professor Tushnet has recently argued, however, the
103
principle of formal equality has powerful and attractive virtues.
Most prominent among these is what he calls its "administrability";
the principle is hard and fast, and departures from it are typically
quite easy to identify. The possibility of manipulation and invidious
discrimination against unpopular religions will be much less in a
formal as compared to a substantive regime, though general
sensitivity to claims of religion will also diminish. Were the Kurland
principle to be modified to allow for judicially identified, religionspecific exemptions required by the Free Exercise Clause, 10 4 the
principle of formal religious equality would probably be the
101See Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court,29 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1, 6 (1961).
102 Soon after its publication, the Kurland principle was rejected in the context of
free exercise exemptions as well. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963)
(holding that South Carolina's unemployment laws may not burden a Sabbatarian's
free exercise rights by forcing "a worker to abandon his religious convictions
respecting the day of rest"). Employment Division, Department offHuman Resources
v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990), has since resurrected Kurland's thesis, but only with
respect to judicial enforcement of the Free Exercise Clause. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at
1600 ("[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the
law proscribes... conduct that his religion prescribes... .'" (quoting United States
v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment))).
10 3 See Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland
Revisited, 1989 Sup. Cr. REv. 373, 374-75.
104 The suggested modification is mine, not Professor Tushnet's. His piece follows
closely on the heels of another in which he seemed more sympathetic to the
accommodationist view. See Mark Tushnet, The EmergingPrincipleof Accommodation
of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEo. LJ. 1691, 1691 (1988) (pointing out that the
accommodation principle is "normatively attractive" but difficult to "work out as a
coherent principle of constitutional adjudication").
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soundest single solution to the general problems of the religion
clauses.
The principle of formal religious equality would, of course,
automatically forbid discretionary accommodations. Accommodations are, by definition, religion-specific, and therefore represent
prima facie violations of the principle. The easiest cases under the
principle are 1) explicit preferences for one or more sects over
others, and 2) preferences for members of religious sects over
religious individuals. The first of these cases is illustrated by
statutes that protect Christian Scientists, but not others who reject
conventional Western medicine on religious grounds, from
application of child abuse laws,10 5 and by laws that exempt Native
American Church members, but not members of other religions in
which peyote use is sacramental, from criminal prohibitions on drug
use.1 0 6 The second sort of breach of formal equality-preferring
sects to individuals-is less common. The conscientious objector
10 7
provision in early versions of the Selective Service laws did this,
and the sect preferences described above do so indirectly, by
excluding individuals as well as the nonpreferred sects from their
protective umbrella.
The principle of formal religious equality would also end the
unhappy judicial struggle over the content and context of the
display of religious holiday symbols at public expense. A body of
case law that approves of public support of Nativity Scenes in parks
105 See John T. Gathings, Jr., Note, When Rights Clash: The Conflict Between a
Parent'sRight to Free Exercise of Religion Versus His Child's Right to Life, 19 CUMB. L.
REV. 585, 586-87 nn.7-8 (1989) (listing state statutory religious exemptions from the
duty to provide medical care for their children when such care conflicts with parents'
faith healing beliefs, and pointing out that some states require that the parents'
beliefs be part of a "recognized" religion); see also Ivy B. Dodes, Note, "Suffer the Little
Children.. .": Toward A judicialRecognition of a Duty of Reasonable Care Owed Children
by Religious Faith Healers, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 165, 177-78 & nn.69-71 (1987)
(discussing Christian Scientist exemptions and benefits); JoAnna A. Gekas, Note,
Calfornia'sPrayerHealingDilemma,14 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 395, 396 (1987) (noting
that California protects "'recognized' religions over unrecognized religions"); Daniel
J. Kearney, Note, ParentalFailure to Provide Child with Medical Assistance Based on
Religious Beliefs Causing Child's Death-Involuntamy Manslaughter in Pennsylvania, 90
DICK. L. REv. 861, 861-62 (1986) (noting that the Faith Tabernacle Church is not
exempt from child abuse laws in Pennsylvania).
106See Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1213-20
(5th Cir. 1991) (holding that federal and Texas laws exempting the Native American
Church but not exempting Peyote Way from peyote possession prohibitions are
constitutional).
107 See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 171 (1965) (citing early Selective
Service laws).
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next to Santa and his reindeer,10 8 and Chanukah menorahs next
to Christmas trees, 10 9 but disapproves of Nativity Scenes in
courthouse hallways, 110 does not inspire confidence." 1 Justice
O'Connor's test of whether such displays constitute "endorsements"112 represents a step in the right direction, because it
reflects concern for equality of religious liberty. The test has been
soundly criticized for its manipulability, unpredictability, and
pseudo-objectivity," 3 however, and we would best move beyond
"endorsement" to a standard that quite simply bars state-supported
display of all messages and symbols with commonly perceived
religious content. If none of these symbols may be publicly
108 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984).
109 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 620 (1989).
110 See id.

111 Moreover, it does not discourage continued litigation over such questions. See,
e.g., Doe v. Small, 934 F.2d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Establishment
Clause prohibits the city from encouraging, authorizing, and endorsing Christmas
season display of series of 16 paintings depicting scenes from the life of Jesus);
Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 782 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit the state from making Good Friday an official holiday);
Doe v. Village of Crestwood, 917 F.2d 1476, 1479 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that city
sponsorship of Italian Mass as part of holiday festival violates Establishment Clause),
petitionfor cert.filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3726 (U.S. Apr. 8, 1991) (90-1573); Harris v. City
of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1402 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Establishment Clause
forbids use of Latin Cross on municipal seal), petitionfor cert.filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3154
(U.S. Aug. 19, 1991) (No. 91-299); North Carolina Civ. Lib. Union v. Constangy, 751
F. Supp. 552, 555 (W.D.N.C. 1990) (holding that the Establishment Clause prohibits
statejudge's practice of opening court each day with a prayer), aff'd, 1991 WL 212995
(4th Cir. 1991).
112 See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 623-27 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also County
of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595-97 (Blackmun,J., for the Court in part and dissenting in
part) (applauding O'Connor's notion that "any endorsement of religion [is] 'invalid'").
3 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It'." The Supreme Court
and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 536 (1986) (arguing that O'Connor's test
is deficient because it requires a subjective determination of what constitutes an
"endorsement"); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions:
Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266, 267
(1987) (arguing that O'Connor's "no endorsement" test would introduce "further
ambiguities and analytical deficiencies" into the Court's Establishment Clause
analysis).
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subsidized, none can be invidiously favored or disfavored. 114 In
any event, formal religious equality presses toward such a result.
More complex questions are presented by preferences for
religious over nonreligious association generally. As noted in Part
I, above, the Supreme Court has wavered in its treatment of such
policies. In Corporationof the PresidingBishop of the Church ofJesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Amos, 115 the Supreme Court upheld
an accommodation in the employment discrimination context; in
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,11 6 the Court invalidated a religionspecific tax exemption as a forbidden establishment.
The larger question raised by any policy that treats religious
institutions differently from all others is the extent to which the
Constitution permits religious association to be privileged over
nonreligious association. 117 Nonreligious association includes but
goes beyond those associations whose raison d'etre is opposition to
religion. Nonreligious association includes all other categories of
intermediate associations-for example, labor unions, political
parties, neighborhood associations, and cause-oriented groups. All
of these associations may serve some of the social and political
functions served by churches; they may be mediating institutions,
devoted to some version of the virtuous or pleasant life, buffering
the individual and enhancing her power in dealing with the large,
impersonal institutions of the state. Moreover, all such associations
presumably would prefer to be as free as churches are in selecting
114 One might create an exception to such an admittedly prophylactic rule in cases
in which the context overwhelmed any possibility that the display would be perceived
as an endorsement. Thus, paintings of religious subjects might be displayed in stateoperated art galleries, when it was plain that artistic merit rather than religious
content was the selection criterion. Cf Small, 934 F.2d at 746 (holding that the
Establishment Clause prohibits the city from encouraging, authorizing, and endorsing
Christmas season display of series of 16 paintings depicting scenes from the life of
Jesus).
115 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
116 489 U.S. 1 (1989); see also Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 710-11

(1985) (holding that state statute requiring employers to accommodate those
employees who were Sabbath observers was unconstitutional); Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1982) (invalidating state statute authorizing churches
and schools, but not other institutions, to block the issuance of liquor licenses to
nearby premises).
11'I, unlike many others who write in this field, make sharp distinctions among
religious individuals, religious association, and "corporate" religious bodies. Part of
my concern resides in the danger of faction, which religious individuals acting alone
do not present, and part resides in my conviction that the Free Exercise Clause
should be read as a guarantor of individual, and not corporate, liberty. See Lupu,
Religious Institutions,supra note 7, at 422-23.
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employees committed to their cause, in being free from taxation or
in any other way being exempt from governmentally imposed
burdens.
The theory of equal religious liberty, formal or otherwise,
cannot satisfactorily answer questions concerning the relative status
of religious and nonreligious association, but overarching themes in
constitutional law can resolve this dilemma. For purposes of stateindividual mediation generally, or for purposes of inculcating virtue
in particular, religious association cannot be preferred to nonreligious counterparts. 118
Nonreligious associations may perform
many of the psychological, social, political, and economic functions
commonly associated with religion; that is, they may help individuals
make the world smaller and more coherent, teach and help to
preserve the continuity of values, proselytize, develop and maintain
ritual, promote good or evil, provide support in times of trouble or
sorrow, and facilitate commercial transactions among members who
know and trust one another. Indeed, the only distinctive function
of religion is spiritual and theological, and these concerns must
remain outside the legitimate boundaries of the state's power to
promote or retard. 119 Thus, whether or not it violates any version
of equal religious liberty, legislative preference for religious
associations over others violates equal associational liberty.
The Supreme Court's doctrines about aid to religious organizations have been sensitive to this concern, even though the proponents of accommodation have not. The Court tends to uphold such
programs only if they exhibit a breadth of coverage sufficient to
include nonreligious organizations. It was on this basis that twenty
years ago the Court upheld state property tax exemptions for
religious institutions, 120 and this consideration has been among
118 We have begun to realize that the reverse is also true. See Board of Educ. v.
Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2372-73 (1990) (upholding requirement of Equal Access
Act that religious student groups be afforded treatment equal to nonreligious groups
in schools that maintain an open forum for extracurricular activities).
119 This point is further developed in Stephen G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?:
Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 52 U. PT. L. REV. 75, 166-85 (1990) (arguing that the qualities that
make religion distinctive are those that government may not promote).
120 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970).
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the bases for evaluation of state programs for aid to private
12 1
schools.
In addition, the Court's narrow interpretation of the Title VII
requirement that employers (public and private) reasonably
accommodate their employees' religious practices 122 is explicable
in light of the principle of equal associational liberty. The requirement has always been at war with the basic theory of Title VII; all of
its other prohibited discriminations reflect a focus on status rather
than conduct choices. In TWA v. Hardison,123 the Supreme Court
reduced the dissonance in the statute by glossing the "reasonable
accommodation" provision to limit an employer's duty to that of
providing "de minimis" accommodations. 124 These developments
can, of course, be analyzed in terms of the economic burden that
would be imposed upon others if the requirement were to be
construed more vigorously; the greater the workplace accommodation of religious practice, the greater is the forced subsidy of
observant employees by employers and fellow employees.
If
coercive taxation to support the religious practices of others is a
constitutional vice, so is coercive regulation of one's economic
125
affairs to the same end.
Another powerful objection to the accommodation requirement,
however, relates to its discrimination among voluntary associations.
Title VII privileges employees' conduct choices driven by religious
concerns, but omits protection of, inter alia, parenting practices,
political association, and other practices motivated by deep
attachments to communities other than the workplace. Moreover,
except for the exemption for religious institutions upheld in Amos,
the statute does not require similar accommodation for the
religious, or other associational, concerns of employers about the
composition of the workforce. 126 The "de minimis" interpreta121 See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390, 396 (1983) (holding that a state
statute providing deductions for educational expenses did not violate the Establishment Clause when applied to those who attended religious schools).
122 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1988).
123 432 U.S. 63 (1977).

124 See id. at 84-85. In Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69
(1986), the Court limited the duty still further by holding that the employer need not
consider the employee's accommodation proposal if the employer's proposal is itself
a reasonable one.
125 See supra text accompanying notes 70-83.
126 See State v. Sports and Health Club, 370 N.W.2d 844, 853 (Minn. 1985) (en
banc), appeal dismissed,478 U.S. 1015 (1986) (rejecting claim by employer that it was
motivated by Christian principles and, accordingly, should be free to limit hiring to
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tion in Hardisonthus limits the damage to equal associational liberty
that otherwise might be worked by employment discrimination law.
Not all of the consequences of formal equality theory, or of
associational equality, are to the detriment of religion. Most
significantly, under such a theory, programs of government aid to
institutions that carry out public purposes (such as education or
helping the poor) would have to include religious institutions. This
would produce sweeping, religion-favoring alterations in the law of
nonestablishment, under which direct financial aid to religious
127
entities remains limited.
The law here is changing faster than many have noticed,
however.
The Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Bowen v.
Kendrick128 suggests a strong likelihood that the law of direct aid,
designed for secular purposes, that includes religious beneficiaries
is moving strongly in the direction of formal equality and away from
a strictly separationist, no-aid view. Although I question the
outcome of Bowen v. Kendrick, because of the theological tilt in its
aid criteria, 129 its deeper underpinnings reflect a doctrine of
formal equality. So long as government decisionmakers are not
motivated by a covert desire to aid religion qua religion, or to aid
a particular religion, religious institutions should be eligible for the
same kind and degree of assistance as other institutions serving the
same purpose in a nonreligious setting.' 30 This is not accommoChristians).
127 See, e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397-98 (1985)
(holding that programs funded by the public for nonpublic school students in
religious schools violate the Establishment Clause); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402,
414-15 (1985) (holding that it is unconstitutional for the city of New York to use
federal funds to pay public school employees teaching remedial, non-religious subjects
in parochial schools).
128 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
129 The Adolescent Family Life Act authorized grants to organizations for
purposes of responding to problems of teen-age sexuality and pregnancy, but the
grants could not be used for abortion counselling or services. See 42 U.S.C. § 300z-7
to -10 (1988). Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1764 (1991), reinforces the idea that
government may tilt aid against information that might facilitate the choice to
terminate a pregnancy.
130 As I suggest above, and suggest further in The Trouble with Accommodation, the
Supreme Court has been heading toward but has not yet arrived at this position. See
Lupu, supranote 4. The stumbling block appears to be the problem of ensuring that
public monies serve secular purposes, such as educating children, and not religious
purposes of inculcation. If an answer requires an absolute guarantee of no such
crossover, the problem is insoluble. If, however, allocation of costs between secular
and religious components of an enterprise is thought constitutionally feasible,
economic methods for so doing are available. SeeJesse H. Choper, The Establishment
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dation, as I have defined it; however, it is a distinct and dramatic
alteration in the doctrine of separation, which I believe to be as
flawed as accommodation when viewed from the perspective of
13 1
equal liberty.
It bears noting that the general constitutional law of equality, at
least in the field of race, has moved increasingly in the direction of
formality.13 2 The proponents of accommodation thus bear the
burden of explaining why (contrary to the developing case law) the
substantive view is to be generally preferred as a norm of constitutional equality, or, alternatively, why religious equality should be
subject to a set of constitutional norms different from those
applicable in the field of race or gender.
The accommodationists have, it seems to me, two responses to
this. First, as Professor Laycock has argued, rights under the Free
Exercise Clause are substantive and noncomparative and are thereby
of a different character than rights under the Equal Protection
Clause. 13 3 This is correct, as far as it goes, but it does not go
nearly far enough to support the position of Professor McConnell,
who has urged accommodation well beyond what the Constitution
guarantees as a matter of right. The case for discretionary accom-

Clause and Aid to ParochialSchools, 56 CAL. L. REV. 260,340 (1968) (proposing a rule
that governmental aid to parochial schools be deemed constitutional to the extent the
aid not exceed the value of the schools' secular services); McConnell & Posner, supra
note 6, at 20-30 (discussing different economic methods of determining when
government action impinges on religious choice).

131 1 take it to be among the central points in Professor McConnell's recent essay
comparing funding of abortions and religious schools, that the law should not
privilege secular education over religious education. See McConnell, supra note 31,
at 1046 (arguing that the government should fund religious schools if it funds secular
schools absent a "plausible, non-hostile reason for selective funding").
132 Croson suggests this is so in the law of voluntary affirmative action, where the
Carolene Products perspective has been yielding to more formal approaches.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), rejected the substantive egalitarian view

that the racially disparate impact of a facially race-neutral policy was of independent
constitutional significance. Thus, the Constitution has been increasingly read not to
require, and indeed to limit, government reliance on substantive theories of racial
equality. There is, of course, substantial literature to the contrary. See, e.g., T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, A Casefor Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060 (1991)
(arguing that color-consciousness is essential to racial justice); David Chang,
DiscriminatoyImpac Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 790,
793 (1991) (arguing that affirmative action programs should only be invalidated if
they were adopted out of racial prejudice); Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate
Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 586-89 (1977)

(criticizing the Washington v. Davis court for its inappropriate analysis of the
disproportionate racial impact issue); sources cited supra note 87.
133 See Laycock, Remnants, supra note 13, at 13-21.
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modations cannot depend upon the substantive content of the Free
Exercise Clause, and it is thus left in need of a different argument
to distinguish the case of religious equality from race or gender
equality.
Second, accommodationists might respond, regimes of formal
equality in the fields of race and gender formally privilege no
one, 134 but the regime of formal religious equality will privilege
the secular.1 3 5 In a universe of substantive religious equality, by
contrast, the realm of the secular is not similarly privileged.
This assertion of secular advantage in the formal, anti-accommodationist view is not merely true; it is constitutionally appropriate
and balanced, and politically desirable. Constitutional propriety for
secular privilege is supported by the Constitution's Preamble-it is
Liberty's Blessings, not God's, that we are trying to secure "to
ourselves and our Posterity." 13 6
The constitutional balance
inheres in the relationship between the religion clauses; the Free
Exercise Clause allows the privileging of religious individuals over
nonreligious ones, and the Establishment Clause reverses the
privilege for all matters not protected by the requirement of free
exercise. This arrangement protects the essentials of religious
liberty and helps to insulate politics against the strife of religious
faction.

134 The substantive equality argument is that regimes of formal equality will tend
in fact to privilege groups with relatively more political power.
15 For an unusual variant on possible meanings of the secular, see Steven D.
Smith, Separationand the "Secular":Reconstructingthe DisestablishmentDecision, 67 TEX.
L. REv. 955, 985-88 (1989).
136 U.S. CONST. pmbl. See Milton Handler, Brian Leiter & Carole E. Handler, A
Reconsideration of the Relevance and Materiality of the Preamble in Constitutional
Interpretation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 117, 119 (1990) (suggesting that the Preamble
provide guidance in the resolution of important constitutional issues). The notion
of secular privilege also helps explain cases such as Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97, 109 (1968), wherein the Court held that the Constitution forbids enactment of a
law removing the teaching of Darwinian evolution from public schools, because the
law's passage was motivated by a protectionist concern for religious Creationism. For
elaboration of the general argument about the requirement of secular privilege, see
Gey, supra note 119, at 116-85. The only "pro-religious" item in the 1787 Constitution is at its very conclusion, in which the Constitution is declared to have been
"Done in Convention... the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of Our Lord
one thousand seven hundred and Eighty-Seven and of the Independence of the
United States of America the Twelfth." U.S. CONsT. art. VII.
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3. Political and Social Concerns About Accommodation
Accommodations are troublesome for reasons that transcend the
likely violence they will inflict upon equality of religious liberty. If
political entities may make religion-specific policies even when not
so required by the Constitution, a number of unappealing consequences may follow.
First, religion-specific policies promote the concept of religion
as an interest, looking after the tangible concerns of its members,
rather than acting as a force for moral good. This perception has
hurt racial minorities and has the potential to backfire similarly on
religious institutions; religious spoils systems are no more attractive
than their racial counterparts. When religious entities pursue moral
ends, such as aid for the poor or world peace, they seek objectives
13 7
Although
that have secular translation and secular benefits.
such policies may "accommodate" religious precepts, they can be
politically defended in religion-neutral terms. 13 8 By contrast, the
efforts by religious institutions to secure political recognition of
holidays, customs, or deviant social practices may appear narrowly
self-interested and may thereby undercut religion's moral force.
Second, some acts of accommodation may undercut the project
of constitutional democracy, which depends upon a citizenry
capable of exercising independent and critical judgment concerning
policies and leaders. Voluntary associations may provide a setting
in which these skills can be enhanced in small, face-to-face interactions. Religious institutions, however, frequently claim divine
inspiration of their principles and leaders as a basis of power and
legitimacy. Such claims discourage skepticism and make intense
demands for obedience by adherents. The Constitution requires
toleration of such institutions, but it would be constitutional folly to
1 7

3 See generally KENT GREENWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND

POLITICAL

CHOICE (1988) (discussing the problem of religiously motivated arguments in public
policy arenas); MICHAELJ. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND
MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (forthcoming 1991).
138 When such policies are not easily translated into secular terms, they are most

politically suspect. The anti-abortion movement most enhances its political appeal
when it plays to arguments with obvious secular translation, such as the concern of
the elderly and the disabled that their lives may become viewed by others as "low
quality" and therefore dispensable. For a chilling demonstration that such political
movements can be as non-rational as purely religious ones, see Peter Singer, On Being
Silenced in Germany,N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Aug. 15, 1991, at 36,36-42 (describing hostility
and intolerance towards ideas of medical ethics that permit withdrawal of life
supports from patients in some circumstances).
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read the Establishment Clause to permit support and encouragement for intermediate institutions that undermine rather than
mutually reinforce habits of mind necessary for democratic
13 9
decisionmaking.
Third, Professor McConnell's political case for accommodation
rests in part on the notion that, for those with deep religious
beliefs, theological claims may be "prior to and of greater dignity
than the claims of the state." 140 Indeed, Professor McConnell
asserts that the Constitution itself embodies the view that religious
claims are superior to claims of the state.1 4 1 For many individuals
in the society, this ranking may well be descriptively accurate, and
the cases in which that is so are likely to be the strongest candidates
for free exercise protection.
This sort of challenge to the legitimacy and authority of the
state, however, is the most fundamental of all that might be
advanced. Concessions to such challenges should be limited to
situations in which they are persuasively and demonstrably appropriate, and they should not be made subject to majoritarian political
processes. Political refusal to make voluntary accommodations may
be profoundly disrespectful to deeply held theological views that
support the accommodation request. In addition, political willingness to make such accommodations may, in a different way,
undermine religion by breeding cynicism and disrespect for the
character of religious claims and claimants.
Moreover, such concessions to claims of theological superiority
over secular norms should not be extended in a generalized and
overbroad way to those who do not in fact hold such views.
Voluntary accommodations are errors in statecraft, because they will
run 1) to those who do not hold religious claims to be morally
superior to the claims of the state, as well as to those who do, and
2) to those whose assertions of religious claims may be fraudulent.
A state unwisely undermines its authority to govern when it makes
reflexive, overbroad, and imprecise jurisdictional concessions to
rivals for popular support and authority. One expects the state's
law to reflect the political community's version of the First Coin159 See Gey, supra note 119, at 172-80.
140 McConnell, Accommodation,supranote 6, at 15;see alsoMcConnell, Revisionism,

supra note 11, at 1152 (asserting that the Free Exercise Clause, as understood by
James Madison, reflects the theological position that God is sovereign).
141 "[T]he Free Exercise Clause is not an expression of the will of the sovereign
but a declaration that the right to practice religion is jurisdictionally beyond the scope
of civil authority." McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 11, at 1151.
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mandment-the state first, other institutional loyalties thereaf14 2
ter.
B. The Institutional Case Against Accommodation
For those, like myself, attracted to the virtues of formal equality,
there remains the broader question of whether free exercise
exemptions from general laws are ever acceptable. Professor
Kurland, applying his principle across the constitutional board and
without regard to which governmental institution is acting, believes
they are not. His theory would forbid a statutory exemption for the
use of wine in religious ritual from a legislative prohibition on
alcohol use, and would similarly block courts from importing such
an exemption by way of the Free Exercise Clause. In his view, if the
policy arguments for prohibition were sufficiently strong, they
would simply trump religious concerns; conversely, if the religious
convictions on the matter were sufficiently widespread or persuasive, the general prohibition scheme would not be enacted. No
"accommodations" are possible. 143
This view seems rigid, creating zero-sum games when other
possibilities seem present. This view would also result in some
substantive violence to religious choices. Moreover, Kurland's view
treats . all concerns on policy matters as having equal weight;
therefore, it neglects the possibility that the Free Exercise Clause
might require special recognition of the unusual character and high
1
intensity of religious commitments. 4

142 Different Bible translations offer differing translations of the First Com-

mandment. Compare "Then God spoke all these words: I am the LORD your God,
who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of slavery; you shall have

no other gods before me." Exodus 20:1-3 (The New Oxford Annotated Bible)
(footnote omitted) with "God spoke, and these were his words: I am the LORD your
God who brought you out of Egypt, out of the land of slavery. You shall have no
other God to set against me." Exodus 20:1-3 (The New English Bible) (footnote
omitted).
143 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
144 See generallyJohn H. Garvey, FreeExercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18
CONN. L. REV. 779 (1986) (discussing the factors that make religious commitments
unusual).
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1. The Preference for Courts
The path of reconciliation of the regime of formal religious
equality with the commands of the Free Exercise Clause is institutional, not substantive. 145 The Smith Court was exquisitely correct
in focusing upon the institutional question-which branch of
government, if any, may specially recognize religion specific claimsbut precisely wrong in its response.
My view matches Professor Kurland's in its bluntness, though
not in its conclusion. Courts, adjudicating cases in which free
exercise claims are raised, may respond affirmatively to those that
are meritorious. Nonadjudicative decisionmakers should not enact
religion-specific solutions-that is, they should not accommodate as
I have defined the term-even if they have strong grounds on which
to believe that courts will require them to do so. Moreover,
executive branch officials, such as prosecutors, should be at least as
146
constrained as legislators.
To some, this iron rule of institutional allocation will no doubt
seem counterintuitive or worse. It appears to invite legislative and
executive branch activity that unconstitutionally fails to exempt
religiously motivated conduct of a sort that courts will ultimately
protect. Such an institutional rule favors those religious groups
with the will and resources to litigate over those who prefer to
engage in direct political action. The rule will presumably not
maximize religious liberty in the way Professors Laycock and
145 The argument in text reflects a larger view that considerations of institutional
trustworthiness are of central significance in constitutional law. See generallyJoHN

HART ELY, DEMOCRACY & DIsTRUsT: A THEoRY OFJUDICIAL REvIEW (1980) (arguing

thatjudicial review should focus on remedying malfunctions in the other branches of
government); Neil K. Komesar, TakingInstitutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy
for ConstitutionalAnalysis, 51 U. CHi. L. REv. 366 (1984) (proposing a comparative
institutional approach to constitutional law).
146 When administrative agencies act quasi-judicially, they should act like courts
and be receptive to claims of free exercise exemption from general laws. This is
consistent with the line of cases upholdingfree exercise claims in the unemployment
compensation context. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829
(1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). But see
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990)
(holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not require the state to exempt
unemployment compensation claimants from general definition of misconduct).
When agencies act in their rule-making capacities, however, the dangers of political
accommodation remain. Indeed, to the extent that political factions are more likely
to dominate agencies than legislatures, the dangers here are acute and worthy of
special attention.
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McConnell would do by providing free exercise interests two or
more chances to prevail. 147
Moreover, the rule may appear
terribly inefficient; why should religious groups have to litigate to
enforce rights which legislatures or executives might voluntarily
provide?
Nevertheless, this kind of sharp institutional distinction is
prophylactically essential to the joint project of respecting religion's
constitutional place while simultaneously avoiding invidious
religious discrimination. For reasons derived from the institutional
analysis that follows, I would introduce to constitutional law the
concept of questions that are "justiciable only"-that is, questions
that political branches should perceive as committed to adjudication
alone as a decision procedure-and I would make special treatment
for religion the first member of the set.
a. The Obligation to Decide
Courts typically have mandatory jurisdiction; 4 8 they must
decide the merits of cases properly before them. In contrast, other
branches of government are not similarly obliged to respond to the
merits of all requests that they exercise their power. This political
discretion allows elected officials simply to ignore accommodation
requests from religious groups lacking in numbers, resources, or
other indicia of political influence. The power to ignore the claims
of the less influential significantly increases the likelihood of
1 49
invidious discrimination among religions.

147 See Laycock, Remnants,supranote 13, at 15; McConnell, Revisionism,supra note
11, at 1149-50. When one recalls the possibility of favorable executive or administrative action, as well as legislative or judicial, it becomes apparent that accommodationists would provide more than two chances in a number of contexts.
148 This is not true of the Supreme Court. My argument, however, is that those
advancing free exercise claims have a constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity
to be heard. That sort of due process of the Free Exercise Clause does not require
Supreme Court review any more than the procedural guarantees associated with any
clause so require. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, FirstAmendment "DueProcess,"83
HARV. L. REV. 518 (1970) (arguing that sensitive procedural devices are necessary
whenever First Amendment claims are involved).
149 See Laycock, supra note 88, at 1015-16; Laycock, Remnants, supranote 13, at 54-
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b. The Significance of Written Decision

Courts must not only decide the merits of cases properly before
them; they are, in addition, obliged by a strong sense of institutional
custom to describe the factual world put before them in litigation
and to give reasons for their decisions. This obligation of description and rational explanation helps ensure intellectual honesty and
consistency by making public the judge's account of 1) the religious
character of the claim; 2) the content of legal norms relevant to the
disposition of the claim; 3) the credibility and persuasiveness of the
state's response to the claim; and 4) the application of the relevant
norm and the appropriate conclusion. Indeed, free exercise claims
typically involve traditions that are out of the mainstream; thus, they
depend strongly upon thick description, first by the litigants to the
judge and then by the judge to the outside world. 150
In contrast, political branch response to accommodation
requests are not encumbered by any comparable device to ensure
intellectual honesty, thorough description, or accountability to any
coherent formula for governmental response to such claims. The
absence of such institutional decision procedures means that all
accommodation decisions will be ad hoc, thus aggravating the risk
of invidious discrimination.
c. The Requirement of Principle

Although free exercise adjudication obviously requires legal
judgment, it does not necessarily, contrary to the assertion in Smith,
involve the exercise of policy discretion or balancing of interests.
Judicial decisions must rest on norms that transcend the immediate
context in which they are applied. 151 Because decisions by other
branches are not similarly constrained, the risk is greater that their
accommodations of religion will turn more on political favoritism
and influence than on judgments of constitutional entitlement or
acute religious need.
The contention that judicial decisions may rest on norms
different in character from those employed elsewhere in governance
is deeply controversial as ajurisprudential matter. That controversy
has been particularly acute in constitutional law, 15 2 though it is by
150 For elaboration of this quality of free exercise adjudication, see Lupu, supra

note 4.
I" See Herbert Wechsler, TowardNeutralPrinciplesof ConstitutionalLaw,73 HARv.
L. REV. 1, 19 (1959).
152 See e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
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no means so limited. To make matters worse for my argument,
judicial application of free exercise principles has often been
condemned, by myself -and' others, as reflecting unprincipled
religious bias, quarter-hearted commitment, the desire to marginal1 53
ize religion, and a tendency to be result-oriented.
I do not intend to use this paper as a forum for the general
defense of the possibility of principled decisionmaking under the
Free Exercise Clause. Nevertheless, I believe that the argument
against accommodation holds whether or not such decisionmaking

is possible.
First, if we assume the worst-that judicial decisions are simply
another form of political choice, as vulnerable as any other to the
corrosion of bias, 154 and, therefore, not entitled to any special
constitutional status-then accommodations will never rest on
grounds of general principle. If that is so, however, accommodations will always create invidious distinctions and should be
minimized. One way of minimizing accommodations is to limit
them institutionally to the judicial branch and substantively to those

Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983) (arguing that the
construction of a satisfactory constitutional theory is either impossible or unnecessary).
15 See Steven Pepper, Taking the FreeExercise ClauseSeriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv.
299; Lupu, Where Rights Begin, supra note 7, at 934 n.6, 945-46; Tushnet, supra note
103, at 381-83.
154 Judges can engage in acts of invidious discrimination. The record in matters
of religion, however, suggests thatjudges may have done somewhat better than they
are usually given credit for. First, in the Supreme Court alone, the victors in free
exercise cases have includedJehovah's Witnesses, Seventh-Day Adventists, the Amish,
an individual who apparently deviated from his religion's conventional teachings, and
another individual without any religious affiliation at all who claimed to celebrate a
Sabbath. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (nonreligious Sabbath claimant); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (conventional
teachings deviant); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Seventh-Day Adventists); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (Jehovah's Witnesses); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Jehovah's Witnesses). The losers in the Supreme Court have
also included minority religions. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of
Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990) (Fundamentalist Christians); Hernandez v.
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (Scientologists); Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Assoc., 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (Non-Christian Native American);
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (Non-Christian Native American); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (Jews); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S.
574 (1983) (Fundamentalist Christians); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)
(Jews). Rather, reflecting the Constitution's secularist orientation and/or the bias
common among many well-educated Americans against any form of intense religious
commitment, the Court has been somewhat skeptical of all.
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situations in which judges can plausibly-though dishonestly and
unpersuasively-defend them as matters of principle. 155 This
version of the world is unattractive, but it is no worse, and probably
better, than the pseudo-pluralistic version in which politicians are
trading special privileges for religion in exchange for political
support.
Alternatively, if we assume judicial choices to respond favorably
to religious claims of special treatment are in fact based on
constitutionally sound and general principles, then my argument for
institutional monopoly over this breed of decisions becomes far
stronger. Exemptions granted by judges will rest exclusively on a
foundation of general norms, applicable to free exercise claims from
across the "spectral march" 156 these cases exhibit. In contrast,
voluntary accommodations will rest on an uneasy and unprincipled
foundation of concern for religious liberty and the political strength
of pro-accommodation forces. 157 Without the force of general
principle, there can be no guarantee that like claims to accommodation will be treated alike; without such like treatment, equal
religious liberty will be perpetually undermined.
d. The Limitation on the Scope ofJudicialDecisions
On whatever basis it rests and whatever its theoretical legitimacy, judicial decisionmaking in free exercise cases creates tangible
and immediate benefits only for litigating parties. Although the
parties may in other contexts include large classes, free exercise
cases rarely if ever involve class claims. The reason is rooted in a
Accommodations would be eliminated completely by adoption of the Kurland
view, but that would do violence to all bona fide exemption claims. See supra note
101 and accompanying text.
156 See Lupu, Where Rights Begin, supranote 7, at 947 ("Behind every free exercise
claim is a spectral march; grant this one, a voice whispers to each judge, and you will
be confronted with an endless chain of exemption demands from religious deviants
of every stripe.").
157 Indeed, some of the Court's worst acts of prejudiced response to religion
clause problems may have come in cases in which voluntary accommodations have
155

been challenged as establishments. In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), for

instance, the Court turned a blind eye to a context in which the state quite
dramatically threw its weight behind a particular religious tradition. In a reaction of

bias polar to that found in Lynch, the Court's decisions concerning aid to parochial
schools show significant signs of anti-Catholicism. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 635 (1971) (assuming that "indoctrination" occurs in parochial elementary and
secondary schools in Pennsylvania, in which the huge majority of parochial schools

at the time were Roman Catholic).
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crucial element of free exercise doctrine: exemptions under the
clause belong only to those individuals who sincerely believe that a
particular religious obligation should override the state's competing
demands and who are themselves burdened by those demands in a
constitutionally cognizable manner.158
Each beneficiary of a
court's decision, either as a party or as a subsequent claimant
relying on principles of stare decisis, must be able to make this
showing of sincerity. By contrast, legislative and executive accommodations may invite participation by the sincere and insincere
alike. 159 In such cases, religion absorbs the bad odor of those
who act fraudulently in its name.
e. The Role of Uniformity
Accommodationists such as Professor McConnell argue that the
concept rests on the federal constitutional value of religious
liberty, 160 and simultaneously seek to free individual states from
the force of a number of existing federal constitutional constraints
relating to religion. Although federalism arguments always have a
respectable constitutional pedigree, they are usually at war with true
protection of the liberties insulated from state power by the Bill of
Rights.
The constitutional norms I defend here do not suffer similarly.
Judicial decisions that rest on federal constitutional command
purport to apply principles that are, in theory, of equal and uniform
force throughout the nation. Although lower courts may diverge in
results reached in free exercise cases, Supreme Court review will
help unify the field. In contrast, accommodations by state legislatures will 1) create a nonuniform pattern of special treatment for
religious concerns; 2) present an aggravated risk of special treatment for religions dominant in particular states; and 3) create the
further risk of invidiously omitted accommodations for those
8

15

See generally Lupu, Where Rights Begin, supra note 7 (discussing and analyzing

the "burden" problem).
159 This was true, for example, of the accommodation invalidated in Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985), in which the Court found an
Establishment Clause violation in a Connecticut statute which required employers to
permit employees to designate, and thereby avoid work on, a Sabbath day. The
Court's rationale unpersuasively focused on the burden inflicted thereby on
employers. In addition to the fact that the scheme favored Sabbatarian (i.e., Western)
religions over others, the statute also protected the equivalent of "fraudulent" free
exercise claims.
160 See McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 6, at 1.
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religions which are in disfavor. 161 And, if the broad view of
accommodation prevails, there will be little or no review of the sort
necessary to promote and maintain uniformity of federal constitutional principles.
2. The Question of Institutional Cooperation
An overarching institutional question arises from the sharp
distinction I have drawn between judicial vindication of free
exercise claims, which I have defended, and accommodations by
other branches, which I have opposed. Assume, in the extreme
case, that the Supreme Court recognizes the validity of a particular
free exercise claim-for example, the freedom to discriminate on the
basis of gender in the selection of clergy. 1 62 May Congress, or a
state legislature, codify that principle in its employment discrimination statutes? If so, is there any reason why legislatures cannot act
first, anticipating free exercise exemptions that might be approved
by courts?

163

The latter question is easier than the former. Legislatures
should not be free to so anticipate. Doing so would simply be a
voluntary accommodation, couched in the language of constitutional
duty. If legislatures take the lead in declaring such duties, courts
may soon withdraw from the forefront of that enterprise. The
161State courts may extend state constitutional provisions beyond the federal Free
Exercise Clause. Indeed, in the wake of Smith, some have begun to do so as a
mechanism for insulating their pro-exemption results from federal review. See e.g.,
State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 396-97 (Minn. 1990) (holding that the state
constitution exempts an Amish buggy-driver from general law requiring that slowmoving vehicles display special emblem); Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks
Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571,573 (Mass. 1990) (holding that the designation of a church
interior as historical landmark, precluding alteration, is forbidden by the state
constitution). Although state constitutional law, elaborated by statejudges, may also
be infected by bias, the institutional arguments advanced above hold with equal force
in the state setting, at least in those states in which judges are appointed rather than
elected.
162 See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972) (construing Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to exclude religious bodies, hiring for positions of
religious significance, from the statutory prohibition on gender discrimination), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972). For critical commentary on McClure and its progeny, see
Lupu, Religious Institutions, supra note 7, at 396-99.
163 For the view, substantively but not institutionally akin to mine, that the limit
of "accommodations" by legislatures is the free exercise boundary as crafted by
courts, see Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Note, The Free Exercise Boundaries ofPermissible
Accommodation Under the EstablishmentClause, 99 YALE L.J. 1127, 1139 (1990). For an
analysis that tilts in the institutional direction suggested here, see Developments in the
Law, supra note 12, at 1731-40.
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temptation to duck the political responsibility for religion-specific
decisions is always great, and the best institutional mechanism we
have for avoiding invidious discriminations among religions is a
vigilant judiciary, willing and able to take such responsibility. An
overly aggressive legislature may too easily undermine that vigilance
and induce a posture of deference in the judicial branch. That sort
of deference would be the enemy of the constitutional values
reflected in the religion clauses.
Whether legislatures should be able to follow judicial leads
presents a harder question. Once courts have ordered a particular
free exercise exemption, it seems on the surface both efficient and
fair for legislatures to ratify such norms and to establish orderly
procedures for their implementation.
Even in this context, however, danger exists. A free exercise
holding by a court is highly particular, containing conclusions that
certain parties, who may or may not be members of identifiable
sects, are entitled to special treatment. In what terms can that be
ratified as a matter of generalizable policy? Suppose, for example,
that the Supreme Court had reached the opposite result in Smith.
What policies would legislatures be required, and therefore
permitted, to follow? That religious use of peyote was always
privileged against unemployment benefit denials? Against criminal
prosecution?
That such use was privileged if engaged in by
members of the Native American Church? By members of any
church in which peyote use was a ritual? A central ritual?
Legislative reinforcement of free exercise principles will typically
produce one of two kinds of adjudicative contexts. When legislatures exempt religious institutions from policies that convey benefits
to private third parties, those parties may attack the religious
institution's exemption as violating the Establishment Clause. If the
exemption falls, and religious institutions are thereby swept into the
policy's scope, the benefit to third parties will be restored by
1
operation of law. 6
In such cases, courts must ask the narrow and precise question
of whether the exemption is, on the facts, required by the Free
See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (upholding an
employer challenge to a state accommodation policy that swept beyond the more
limited accommodations required by Title VII); cf.Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327 (1987) (refusing to deny the application of section 702 of Title VII, which
exempts religious organizations from the statute's prohibition of religious discrimination, in the face of an employee Establishment Clause challenge).
164
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Exercise Clause; that is, the question should be identical to the one
which the court would have had to resolve at the behest of the
religious institution had no exemption been made. In order to
preserve judicial supremacy over special treatment for accommodations, therefore, all such adjudication must be on an as-applied
basis. Courts should simply not see themselves as empowered to
proclaim that an entire category of exemptions, facts pertaining to
which are not before the court, is required by the Free Exercise
Clause and therefore the permissible subject of religion-specific
16 5
legislation.
The other category of litigation that will follow from legislative
attempts to reflect free exercise principles will involve efforts to
extend religion-specific benefits to nonreligious actors. The classic
example of this pattern is Texas Monthly, in which a nonreligious
periodical sought a refund of sales taxes paid pursuant to a state
statute which exempted from the tax religious literature "published
or distributed by a religious faith." 166 Such a case presents the
substantive dilemma of whether the accommodation is permissible,
and the remedial problem of whether the religious actor should
henceforth bear the burden of the tax, or, alternatively, whether the
prevailing nonreligious actors should now be exempted from the
tax. The maintenance of incentives to litigate Establishment Clause
questions suggests that extension of benefits outside the statutorily
exempted class should be a federally mandated and presumptively
applicable remedy in such cases, but the Supreme Court has not
taken this view; rather, it has treated the question of remedy in such
167
cases as one to be left to state decisionmakers.
The substantive questions in this category of accommodation
cases, however, will always present a contest of free exercise
concerns which arguably support the exemption and competing
165 The breadth of voluntary accommodations, and the absence of case-by-case
scrutiny of constitutional entitlement to their benefits, is sometimes defended as a
good, because of the elimination of inquiry into the religious bona fides of particular
daims. On the view offered here, however, such inquiry is always required, because
the legitimacy of special treatment of religion depends on a finding of religious bona
fides in the individual case. Accommodation is a free exercise remedy, and its validity
depends on the existence of a free exercise right.
166 Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1989).
167 This is consistent with its view in nonreligion cases presenting analogous
problems of remediation. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (invalidating state
rule limiting the benefit of alimony claims to women, but remanding to state court
the question of whether the husband was obliged to continue making alimony
payments on the basis of any gender-neutral state laws).
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concerns for equality-religious equality, expressive equality as in
Texas Monthly, or associational equality-which arguably undermine
it. Only if the Free Exercise Clause requires the exemption can the
competing equality claims be defeated. This principle, while
powerfully substantive, has strong process implications as well in
this class of cases. In such cases, the exempted religious organizations become constitutionally indispensable third parties to the
litigation; 168 the state should not even be permitted, much less
required, to speak for religious actors in defense of constitutional
claims that depend upon unique qualities of religious belief,
organization, or experience. When the state has taken the side of
free exercise, a kind of inverse "due process" should apply. Here,
as elsewhere in the law pertaining to special treatment for religion,
sound constitutional adjudication depends on religious actors
169
speaking for themselves.
C. Revisiting Employment Division, Department
of Human Resources v. Smith
In many areas of law, court-legislative partnerships are of course
desirable and productive. This field, however, is not one of them.
In the context of special treatment of religion, positive acts by the
political branches will generally produce more detriments to the
principle of equal religious liberty than benefits to the principle of
religious liberty per se. Smith is thus profoundly wrong on both
substantive and institutional grounds, and the voluntary accommodations it invites will in the long run do far more harm than good
170
to the ends of the religion clauses.
168 Amicus participation by interested religious groups will usually provide a
sufficient solution to the problem. In cases in which such groups do not file
voluntarily, however, judges should make it a practice to invite them to do so. Cf.
ScottJ. Ward, Note, ReconceptualizingEstablishment Clause Cases as Free Exercise Class
Actions, 98 YALE L.J. 1739, 1745-54 (1989) (arguing for a free exercise-class action
approach to the Establishment Clause).
169 For elaboration of this principle in other settings, see Lupu, Religious
Institutions, supra note 7, at 421-22 (criticizing free exercise exemptions for
institutions because individuals may hide insincerity behind institutional masks);
Lupu, Home Education,supra note 7, at 979-90 (defending state policies designed to
limit parental authority to assert religious reasons in support of home education for
their children).
170 The recently reintroduced Religious Freedom Restoration Act, H.R. 2797,
102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), designed to overrule Smith by Act of Congress,
presents interesting problems in light of the argument I have advanced. To the
extent it only requires courts to do what the Free Exercise Clause requires, it does not
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So long as Smith is the law, however, is my anti-accommodation
stance a reasonable one? If accommodation is limited to the special
treatment the Free Exercise Clause requires, and that Clause
requires none, is no accommodation permissible? Two answers are
possible, but only one seems appealing. One might say that the
Free Exercise Clause still "requires" special treatment for religion
in some instances, but that courts will not enforce the requirement. 17 1 Under this theory, legislatures would remain free to
accommodate to some undefined extent. Second, one might simply
adhere to the logic of the no accommodation position and conclude
that legislatures may be no more generous to religion than are
courts. If courts cannot single out religious actors for special
treatment by force of the constitution, then all the equality concerns
that run against such special treatment by legislatures continue to
apply unabated. On this view, contrary to Smith's dicta, the decision
will result in no accommodation of religion by any branch of
government. 172
I am attracted to this second position not only by the force of
the argument I have advanced in this essay; I am drawn to it as well
by Smith's fatal assault on the underpinnings of the pro-accommodation argument. Prior to Smith, accommodationists had vigorously

run afoul of the model I offer. If the results of the Supreme Court's decisions are
the best evidence of what the Free Exercise Clause requires, however, the Act goes
"too far," because it does much more than restore the prior law, and therefore
privileges religion and religious association over other constitutionally protected
commitments.
Moreover, the Act would probably be unconstitutional as applied to state
policies; that is, by overturning Smith, it purports to substitute its own general rule
of decision for the Court's on the scope of the Free Exercise Clause, and therefore
exceeds the scope of congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118, 124-31 (1970) (holding that the 1970
Amendment of the Voting Rights Act authorizing eighteen year olds to vote is
unconstitutional insofar as it pertains to state and local elections). Some applications
of the Act to state policies might be supportable under the commerce or spending
power. With respect to federal legislation and policy, Congress may, by legislation,
require obedience to an overarching general norm.
171 See Lupu, supra note 4. See generally Sager, supranote 59, at 1220-28 (arguing
that "underenforced" constitutional norms are valid to their constitutional limits).
172 Justice Stevens, who joined in Smith but has an activist view of nonestablishment, is the member of the Court most likely to support this. See Laycock, supranote
88, at 1010 (asserting that Stevens is hostile to religion, insofar as he votes to
maintain governmentally imposed burdens on religion but votes to block the
distribution of government benefits to it); see also Laycock, Remnants, supra note 13,
at 14 ("[Stevens] prefers even-handed [religious] repression to imperfect [religious]
,liberty."); id. at 35 (accusingJustice Stevens of singling out for disfavored treatment
free exercise claims that prevail in state courts).
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advocated that special treatment of religious actors occur across the
governmental board; that is, that the political branches voluntarily
accommodate religion while the judicial branch adjudicate interstitially for the protection of those religious claims that failed in the
political process. 173 Put more simply, accommodationists believed
that the system as a whole would protect religions generally,
including unpopular minority religion.
Now that Smith has
dramatically undercut the possibility of judicially maintained
backstopping of accommodation by enforcement of free exercise
principles, the accommodationist stance is thus more than ever a
source of support for mainstream religion. There should be little
appeal to a constitutional theory of the religion clauses that, under
current free exercise principles of institutional allocation, helps
most those who need it least.
CONCLUSION

The zone of permissive accommodation is sometimes defined as
the open space between the First Amendment's religion clauses; that
is, the room for special treatment for religion by the political
branches is whatever religion-specific treatment is neither required
by the Free Exercise Clause nor forbidden by the Establishment
Clause. The trend in the law of late, marked on the free exercise
side by Smith, and on the Establishment Clause side by Bowen v.
Kendrick,174 is to widen this zone considerably by reducing the
demands of both clauses.
These trends should be resisted and reversed. If we are to have
a regime of equal religious liberty, judges must in the name of the
Constitution reassert control over distinctive treatment of religion.
When the Constitution requires such treatment, courts should
fearlessly order it; but whatever is not required is presumptively
proscribed, and courts should with equal courage invalidate
forbidden forays by the political branches into 'the field of religious
See McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 11, at 1136.
174 487 U.S. 589, 600-18, 621 (1988) (holding that the federal government may
include religious organizations as grantees under the Adolescent Family Life Act, and
restricting the scope of Establishment Clause limits to situations in which religious
organizations have used government funds to proselytize).
173
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accommodation. Religion is, as others have argued, constitutionally
unique, 175 but what makes it so should be held to disable, not
facilitate, political choices that focus on the subject.

175 See generally Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution,
1983 SuP. CT. REV. 83 (discussing and analyzing the Court's view that special
treatment of religion is particularly likely to be judged unconstitutional).

